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ternational economic and legal order? What are the limits to the
global normative diffusion of regulatory coherence when considering the diverse contexts and agendas of emerging economies, most
notably China?
This article aims to contribute the existing scholarship by making two major claims. First, built upon a historical approach, this
paper traces the trajectory of the development of regulatory coherence. With the United States being the primary driving force, the
concept of regulatory coherence mirrors the key elements of Administrative Procedure Act and has diffused across various jurisdictions through multiple venues, like the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Yet, despite its penetration, the entrenchment of regulatory coherence as a new global norm is conditioned upon complex political economy issues, particularly the role of China. By
exploring the evolution of legal and political underpinnings for the
past decades, this article contends that China has taken what we
describe an “experimental approach” by prudently addressing
regulatory coherence at both domestic and international levels,
largely due to the democratic implications of regulatory reforms.
Such an approach may in the end define the boundary of regulatory coherence as an emerging global norm.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, global governance has received
considerable attention from scholars working in various concentrations. International lawyers and political scientists have addressed
vast increases—in reach as well as form—of cooperative mechanisms transcending national borders by using various theoretical
frameworks, including transgovernmental networks, global administrative law, informal international lawmaking, and transnational private regulations. In the same vein, and in part driven by
the ramifications of heterogeneous regulatory approaches, international economic law scholars have been devoted to exploring new
ways to facilitate international regulatory cooperation through
trade and investment treaties. While these scholars embrace various routes, they share common goals regarding regulation: the reduction of obstacles, the enhancement of legitimacy and accountability, and the promotion of compatibility among regulatory efforts
at various levels.
The concept of regulatory coherence manages the ramifications
of diversified regulatory approaches through rationalizing domestic regulatory processes. Diverging regulations in states and their
cross-border implications represent a sphere of scholarly attention
and intellectual discourse in international economic law. While
neoliberalism-embedded globalization and economic development
have largely defined the world order over the past few decades,
they have also fueled tensions between international cooperation
and regulatory autonomy. For many, divergent regulatory approaches reflect the results of diverse cultural, economic, and political endowments in different countries and fall squarely within the
scope of national sovereignty. For others, however, they may simultaneously constitute non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that serve protectionist purposes. While the World Trade Organization (WTO) introduces a set of proxies (e.g., necessity test, international standard,
and scientific evidence) in its covered agreements—notably, the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS)—there are salient limitations,1 largely due to the incapacity
1
See e.g., Robert W. Saiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade, National
Treatment, and Domestic Regulation, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 149 (2011) (arguing that the
WTO legal framework does little to address excessive nondiscriminatory regula-
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of such institutional designs to go beyond merely scratching the
surface of regulatory divergences by addressing regulatory outputs
and their trade implications.
This is where the normative construction of regulatory coherence enters in by addressing regulatory inputs, as demonstrated by
the institutional design embraced by recent mega-regional agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)2 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).3 TPP and TTIP incorporated “good regulatory practices” that anchor United States
administrative law4 and that have also been endorsed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).5
While these developments appear to indicate the emergence of
regulatory coherence as the new global norm, it remains unclear
whether and to what extent such a norm can go hand in hand with
emerging economies, in particular China. Although China’s legal
system has witnessed a sea change during the post-WTO era, its
regulatory interventions from time to time have been characterized
as protectionist because of the inadequate level of transparency,
stakeholder participation, and third-party review throughout the
decision-making process. While forging key elements of regulatory coherence (such as transparency and public consultation, regulatory impact analysis, interagency coordination and compatibility,
and administrative and judicial review) in the form of new global
rules may brush away fears regarding China’s beggar-thyneighbor policy, these requirements may also place new pressures
on Chinese leaders by enabling stakeholders—both foreign and
domestic—to have a say in the rulemaking process at a much earlitions).
2
Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Trade (not yet in
force), ch. 25, https://mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/transpacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/32QC-ZBM], [hereinafter TPP].
3
Council Directive 11103/13 of 17 June 2013, Directives for the negotiation
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union
and
the
United
States
of
America,
11–12,
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EN5-HR5Y].
4 There is no universally agreed upon definition of the term “good regulatory practices.” For the present purpose, we loosely refer to “regulatory coherence”
and “good regulatory practices” interchangeably.
5 See infra Part II.B.
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er stage and to a much greater extent than what is required by the
WTO. At a deeper level, regulatory coherence may entail a transformation of domestic regulatory processes and institutions in
China, requiring more rigorous forms of democratic accountability
and rule of law.
Will China embrace regulatory coherence as the new benchmark for the twenty-first century? How does regulatory coherence—a concept drawn from the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition—fit
into China’s existing regulatory infrastructure, as well as its economic, political, and social context? Will path dependence lead
China in a different direction? Given the United States’ withdrawal from TPP under President Trump,6 China’s approach would
presumably have implications for the way in which regulatory barriers are managed in mega-regionalism—which may in turn spill
over into multilateralism through the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the massive “One Belt, One
Road” (OBOR) Initiative, other emerging pillars of global trade
governance.7 Notwithstanding its significance, however, the role
of China in this regard has been largely left untouched in the growing body of literature on regulatory coherence and cooperation.8
This article seeks to broaden the debate by addressing the ramifications of international regulatory cooperation for China—and vice
versa.
This article argues that, despite the emergence of global regulatory coherence, its real impact is contingent upon diverse contexts
in different countries, among which China’s unique circumstances
pose numerous obstacles to both its regulatory systems and the future of international cooperation. While China’s current system
has substantial institutional infrastructure in theory, in practice
6
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The United States
Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP
[https://perma.cc/QZV8J34M].
7
Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, Austl. Dep’t of Foreign Aff. & Trade (Aug. 30, 2012),
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/Documents/guidingprinciples-rcep.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX5G-T79M]; Alexious Lee, A Brilliant
Plan: One Belt One Road, CREDIT LYONNAIS SECURITIES ASIA (2015),
https://www.clsa.com/special/onebeltoneroad/
[https://perma.cc/M9EDN7DD].
8
For a notable exception, see Henry Gao, TPP, Regulatory Coherence and China’s Free Trade Strategy from A to Z, 7 EUR. Y.B. INT’L. ECON. L. 507 (2016).
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some fundamental flaws persist and shape development of regulatory coherence in the country and beyond. China seems to have
adopted an “experimental approach” with prudent engagement of
regulatory coherence both at domestic and international levels.
This approach provides ample opportunities to map the emerging
contours of global regulatory coherence and its limits.
This article proceeds with Part 1, by exploring the origins, development, and key elements of regulatory coherence. Part 2 analyzes the emergence and global normative diffusion of this movement as the new rule of the game, especially in the recent megaregional agreements vis-à-vis the ground rules set by the WTO’s
multilateral trading system. Part 3 traces the transformation of
China’s administrative law through the pre- and post-WTO eras.
Despite reforms, the gap between the law on the books and the law
in action remains. Part 4 identifies potential limits inherent in the
legal infrastructure of China, considering the underlying political,
economic, social, and cultural contexts. Such limits mirror China’s
recent approaches to regulatory coherence in the sphere of economic integration and may in turn shed light on the future development of global regulatory coherence. Part 5 concludes.
2. THE ERA OF MEGA-REGIONALISM: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL
REGULATORY COHERENCE
2.1. The Concept of Regulatory Coherence
The past decade has witnessed a growing push for the inclusion of additional requirements to promote regulatory coherence in
trade and investment agreements at the bilateral, regional, and
multilateral levels.9 Regulatory coherence obligations have been
contemplated as part of the shift from traditional and easily recognizable barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, to domestic regulations
and “behind the border” measures that effectively constitute nontariff barriers to international trade.10 Indeed, the multilateral rules
9 See Elizabeth Sheargold & Andrew D. Mitchell, The TPP and Good Regulatory Practices: An Opportunity for Regulatory Coherence to Promote Regulatory Autonomy? 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 587 (2016) (noting that chapters relating to regulatory
cooperation are likely to appear more frequently in new preferential trade agreements).
10
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
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under the WTO appear to be successful in addressing discriminatory measures but fall short in addressing inefficient, unclear, redundant—yet non-discriminatory—regulations that are burdensome on trade in goods and services.11 While demand for
regulatory coherence may be high during efforts to reduce nontariff barriers to trade and forge deeper economic integration by
addressing unclear, non-transparent, inefficient, or duplicative
regulations under the purview of international economic law, the
concept of regulatory coherence has domestic (or more precisely,
American) origins that are steeply embedded in democratic accountability and the rule of law.
2.1.1. The American Origins of Regulatory Coherence
The contemporary genesis of regulatory coherence can be
traced back to the United States’ Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), enacted by Congress in 1946.12 The APA established the legal infrastructure of the “administrative state”13 in the United
States, establishing the fundamental principles and procedures in
relation to the nature and enforcement of administrative law in the
country.14 From a historical perspective, the APA was created during a politically contentious, post-New Deal period when Congress
was concerned about the expanding powers of the new federal
agencies created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, beginning in
DIPLOMACY 232 (2nd ed. 1990); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER
NEOLIBERALISM 169–70 (2011); Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—and
Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 101
(2002); Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1999).
11
See Robert W. Saiger & Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Domestic
Regulation 43 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 387, 2009)
(explaining how inefficiently stringent standards may emerge under certain circumstances even if regulatory discrimination is prohibited).
12
Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA], Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946).
13
For a comprehensive discussion on the development of the “administrative state” in the U.S., see generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation,
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
14 See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS (11th ed. 2011).
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1933.15 With the enactment of the APA, Congress arguably struck a
legislative balance to discipline, standardize, and oversee these
federal agencies. This balance evolved over time due to the application and interpretation of the Act by courts, the adoption of subsequent laws concerning relevant issues by Congress, and the
management and practical use of the APA through Presidential
Executive Orders.16
The philosophy governing American administrative law stipulates that only Congress may enact laws and delegate powers to
the executive branch, which makes rules to enforce the law.17
Therefore, when a federal agency crafts regulations, its power is
derived from a statutory command and is exercised in accordance
with applicable APA principles and procedures to ensure the legality and rationality of those regulations. As such, administrative
law requirements include, inter alia, transparency and public consultation, regulatory impact analysis, interagency coordination and
compatibility, and ex-post scrutiny of judicial or administrative review, which also constitute integral elements of the contemporary
concept of regulatory coherence.
2.1.2. Transparency and Public Consultation
The idea of transparency in American administrative law is reflected in the new legal terrain connected to the expanding role of
15
Since 1933, several federal agencies were created pursuant to the new
statutes enacted by the Democratic Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
as part of the New Deal legislative plan to address the social and economic challenged faced by the U.S. after the Great Depression. Some argue that the opponents as well as the supporters of President Roosevelt fought over the passage of
the APA "in a pitched political battle for the life of the New Deal," involving a tenyear period of "painstaking and detailed study and drafting." See George Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); DANIEL E. HALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 2–10 (5th ed. 2011); Administrative Procedure Act,
H.R. JUDICIARY COMM. REP. NO. 79–1989 (1946).
16
See generally STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 14; OECD, Pilot Database on Stakeholder
Engagement
Practices,
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/pilot-database-on-stakeholder-engagement-practices.htm
[https://perma.cc/H8CL-AL72] (illustrating how countries have implemented
recommendations for regulatory policy and governance); see also the discussion
infra in this Part on several Executive Orders issued by different U.S. presidents.
17
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§1, 8; see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 175 F.3d 1027 (1999).
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government with discrete and limited regulatory measures enacted
during the New Deal era.18 The APA, with few exceptions, allows
two procedural venues for creating regulations: an on-the-record,
trial-like approach that is rarely employed these days;19 and a less
formal, commonly utilized “notice and comment rulemaking” process,20 which is the rulemaking process conventionally referred to
by scholars and practitioners.21 While both procedures stress the
transparency requirement, the latter features a structured set of
general obligations pertaining to public consultation. With regard
to transparency and public consultation in the rulemaking process,
the APA requires “general notice of proposed rulemaking” to be
published in the Federal Register:
After notice . . . the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration
of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose.22
Specifically, a federal agency is required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, which includes the
draft regulatory text, a preamble explaining the need for the rule,
and a summary of factual and scientific bases for the rule, to advise
various potential stakeholders of the issues involved so they may
respond with comments, data, or other arguments.23 The agency
18 Sylvia Ostry, China and the WTO: The Transparency Issue, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOR. AFF. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing U.S. leadership in using domestic administrative law to shape a transparent international trade system).
19
See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (discussing the Supreme Court’s marginalization of formal, trial-like rulemaking process in 1972); see also APA, §§556–57 (addressing the agency’s obligations when
conducting proceedings, investigations, and reviews).
20 5 U.S.C. §553.
21
See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 1276, 1312–13 (1972) (discussing the procedural notice and comment rule
making process under U.S. administrative law).
22 See 5 U.S.C. §553 (b) and (c) (requiring general notice of a rulemaking proposal to be published in the Federal Register by publicly issuing a statement of
basis and purpose).
23
See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 31–35 (1947) (discussing the historical materials
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considers the information and comments received while forming
its decision to finalize, revise, or withdraw the proposed rule.24 After the public consultation process is completed, the agency is required to publish the final regulation accompanied by reasoned responses of the regulatory agency to the comments received (which
together constitute part of the object for potential judicial review)
in the Federal Register, which usually enters into force in 30 to 60
days.25
The objective of the transparency and public consultation requirement is to apprise all interested persons of the general purpose and basis of the rule, provide adequate participation and protection of private interests, and facilitate informed, rational,
coherent, and legal administrative action.26 This institutional design, with its high level of transparency, reflects the United States’
common law heritage—with roots in the American Revolution and
intended to ensure against overaccumulation of power—the checks
and balances established through the three branches of the government, the changing relationship between the administrative
state and interest group representation, and the contemporary
reformation of administrative law.27
2.1.3. Regulatory Impact Analysis
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291
partly in response to growing concerns about the regulatory state
and its power, thereby implementing the concept of the regulatory
impact analysis (RIA), which has been embraced as a key element
regarding notice-and-comment rulemaking after the APA’s enactment for the reference of other federal agencies).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26
See Alan Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256–58 (1986) (discussing how federal agencies needed to create fact-gathering procedures because the rule-making process was not
meeting the demands of fact-based policies).
27
See Ostry, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing how U.S. administrative law
influenced the formation of GATT through its historical formation and its unique
structural characteristics of independent regulatory agencies); see also Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669
(1975) (discussing the development and disintegration of the traditional model of
American administrative law).
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of “good regulatory practices,”28 in order to “reduce the burdens of
existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for
regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and
insure well-reasoned regulations.”29 The Executive Order provided that “[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.”30 In addition, agencies were required to
prepare regulatory impact analyses of all major rules and submit
them to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review.31
While debated and criticized,32 Executive Order 12291 essentially
forged the concept of regulatory impact analysis, and in particular
cost-benefit analysis, as a central element of rulemaking that generally applies at the federal level. The embedding of RIA in the
rulemaking processes, and more broadly, public policy development, was a response to increased demand for democratic control
by constituents, motivated by various interests that have different
stakes in and diverse approaches to the administrative process.
2.1.4. Interagency Coordination and Compatibility
President Bill Clinton advanced the concept of regulatory coherence in 1993 by revoking Executive Order 12291 and replacing
it with a new Executive Order, 12866, pertaining to “Regulatory
Planning and Review.”33 A key objective of this Executive Order
was to “enhance planning and coordination with respect to both
new and existing regulations” and to “restore the integrity and legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight.”34 This Executive
See the discussion infra in Part II.B.
Executive Order No. 12291, 46 Fed.Reg. 13193, 127 (Feb. 17, 1981).
30 Id., Sec. 2(b).
31 Id., Sec. 3(c) (requiring agencies to prepare Regulatory Impact Analyses of
major rule when submitting notices of proposed rulemaking and all final rules to
the Director).
32
See e.g. E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under
Executive Order 12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1994) (discussing the complexities, criticisms, and
shortcomings of Executive Order 12291).
33 Executive Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 199 (Sept. 30, 1993).
34 Id., preamble.
28
29
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Order not only strengthens the RIA process required during the
Reagan era,35 but also emphasizes the importance of interagency
coordination and compatibility. The regulatory philosophy and
principles, as stated in the Executive Order, are to avoid inconsistency, incompatibility, or duplication among various regulations
adopted by federal agencies.36
With these goals, the OMB performs coordinated reviews of
agency rulemakings to ensure that regulatory decisions made by
one agency do not conflict with applicable law or “the policies or
actions taken or planned by another agency.”37 With the advisory
assistance of its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), which serves as a “repository of expertise” on regulatory
methodologies and interagency coordination procedures, the OMB
guides federal agencies and assists the President and the Vice President in overall regulatory planning.38 A centralized planning
mechanism was also established through Executive Order 12866,
providing for early interagency coordination of regulatory actions,
facilitating consultation and resolution of potential divergences,
and achieving a common understanding of priorities.39 While
amended and supplemented multiple times following its issuance,40 Executive Order 12866 effectively established some of the
35 As the general regulatory philosophy of this Executive Order, “[I]n deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.” Id.,
Sec. 1(a). In addition, federal agencies are required to “identify and assess available alternatives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.” Id., Sec. 1(b)(3).
36
Id., Sec. 1(b)(10) (requiring that “[e]ach agency . . . avoid regulations that
are inconsistent, incompatible, or duplicative with its other regulations or those of
other Federal agencies.”).
37 Id., Sec. 2(b).
38 Id.
39 Id., Sec. 4 (detailing planning procedures agencies shall adopt in order “to
have an effective regulatory program.”).
40 President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13258 in 2002 as well as
Executive Order 13422 in 2007 to amend 12866. In 2011, President Barrack Obama
promulgated Executive Order 13563 that strengthened the program on Regulatory
Planning and Review and emphasized the importance of public participation.
The Obama Administration further issued another Executive Order 13610 in 2012
to expand provisions on public participation, agency priority setting, and regulatory accountability; see generally Steve Charnovitz, US Efforts to Ensure that Regulation Does Not Present Trade Barriers, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development
[ICTSD]
&
World
Economic
Forum,
(2015),
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Regulatory-Systems-
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fundamental elements of regulatory coherence necessary for the
proper functioning of the administrative state.
2.1.5. Administrative and Judicial Review
Judicial review, together with other mechanisms, is an institutional design implemented to hold governments accountable—
through which a court determines if a statute, an administrative
regulation, or even a treaty trespasses the limits defined by the
Constitution or existing law. Systematic reviews by courts are not
unique to the United States. Rather, as a general principle, they are
perceived and practiced differently in many jurisdictions; there exists a massive variation in legal systems as to the rationale, scope,
and intensity of review, procedural designs, and available remedies. The United States Constitution does not explicitly create a
mechanism of judicial review, whose authority is instead inferred
from the history, structure, and provisions of the Constitution.41
The APA determines the scope of and the procedures for judicial
review of federal agency rulemaking, although the courts have
ruled in support of judicial authority in reviewing administrative
actions.42 With respect to a final rule promulgated by an agency,
stakeholders, interest groups, or other members of the public may
challenge the rule before the court, seeking to strike down the rule
on a number of grounds, including agency action deemed “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”43 Nevertheless, in reviewing the agency action (especially when it concerns an interpretation of a statute), the
court will in principle defer to the technical expertise of the agency
Coherence-Charnovitz-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4GU-WDTS] (discussing
economic growth in the U.S. and the challenges and opportunities experienced
when reducing regulations for trade liberalization).
41 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (illustrating judicial review when
the Court struck down a statute enacted by Congress due to its unconstitutionality).
42
See e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding
that the importance of the right violated implicated the existence of a remedy for
the administrative violation at issue).
43
APA, 5 U.S.C. §706 (2) (for other grounds in which the court might find
agency actions unlawful include: action is “contrary to constitutional rights,” “in
excess of statutory jurisdiction,” “without observance of procedure required by
law,” or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”).
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and strike down the rule if it is contrary to the “unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”44
A unique feature of United States practices is the internal administrative review of federal agency actions,45 whose mechanism
is again provided in Executive Order 12866. More specifically, this
Executive Order mandates that all agencies must submit to the
OIRA an institutionalized plan to periodically review existing significant regulations.46 Such a review mechanism is designed to determine whether regulations “have become unjustified or unnecessary as a result of changed circumstances” and to ensure that they
remain “compatible with each other and not duplicative or inappropriately burdensome in the aggregate.”47 This mechanism allows the agency concerned as well as the OIRA to decide if any
such rules need to be modified or eliminated to increase effectiveness or reduce burdens.48 During such a review, the agency is also
required to identify any congressional mandate that imposes an
obligation on the agency to promulgate or retain regulations it regards as unnecessary or outdated due to changed circumstances.49
To ensure the efficacy of the centralized review of both new and
existing regulations, the OIRA is charged with promoting “greater
openness, accessibility, and accountability in the regulatory review
process.”50 Finally, because the abovementioned administrative
and judicial reviews represent two distinct approaches, nothing in
Executive Order 12866 affects available judicial review venues.51

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081–82 (1986) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of requiring agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of their regulations).
46 Supra note 33, Sec. 5.
47 Id.
48 Id., Sec. 6(b) (defining the OIRA responsibilities when providing guidance
and oversight to ensure that each agency’s actions are consistent with applicable
law and not in conflict with another agency’s policies).
49 Id.
50 Id., Sec. 6 (b)(2)(C)(4).
51
Id., Sec. 10 (stating: “This Executive order is intended only to improve the
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against
the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or
any other person.”).
44
45
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2.1.6. Regulatory Coherence and Regulatory Cooperation
Taken together, the APA, Executive Orders pertaining to regulatory planning and review, and subsequent practices by governmental branches in the United States broadly encompass all of the
elements of regulatory coherence (although the term has never
been mentioned),52 which has subsequently been exported to regional and international fora.53 As previously mentioned, these elements of regulatory coherence reflect the American Revolution,
common law heritage, constitutional design and diffusion of power, and peculiar characteristics of the legal system (such as the substantial use of independent agencies)54 in the United States—all designed to limit the range of discretion enjoyed by administrative
bodies. As a commentator rightly pointed out, the APA and Executive Order 12866 have not addressed international cooperation so
as to cope with different regulatory measures taken by foreign
economies that create disproportionate burdens or foster unnecessary obstacles to trade.55 It was not until President Barack Obama
issued Executive Order 13609 in 2012 that the United States put
explicit emphasis on the importance of international regulatory cooperation in the domestic rulemaking process.56 This Executive
Order established an interagency working group led by the OIRA
to address unnecessary regulatory differences between the United
52 See Rodrigo Polanco, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Regulatory
Coherence: A Legal Analysis of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, in TRADE
LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 231, 246 (Tania Voon ed., 2013) (discussing the objectives of the TPP in harmonizing national regulations to facilitate
trade); see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Regulatory Reform in the United States: Enhancing Market Openness Through Regulatory Reform, at 11, (1999) http://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/2756360.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L5D5-XBBD].
53
See discussion on normative diffusion infra in Part II.B.; Cf. Polanco, supra
note 52, at 231 (“the notion of regulatory coherence has emerged mainly within
international networks of governance.”).
54
See Ostry, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing how U.S. administrative law
influenced the formation of GATT through its historical formation and its unique
structural characteristics of independent regulatory agencies).
55 Charnovitz, supra note 40.
56
Executive Order No. 13609, 77 FR 26413 (May 1, 2012); see Polanco, supra
note 52, at 246 (referencing Executive Order No. 12866, issued under the Clinton
Administration, to demonstrate United States government’s interest in regulatory
coherence).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/4

2018]

The Emergence of Global Regulatory Coherence

149

States and its major trading partners across borders.57
It should be emphasized that the concept of regulatory coherence has (at least to date) largely focused on the domestic administrative context and processes and must be distinguished from the
idea of regulatory cooperation. When employed at the international level, however, the term regulatory coherence is frequently
referred to in regional and multilateral trade discussions, and yet
there is no practical or scholarly consensus regarding its definition.58 Some scholars approach regulatory coherence in an expansive manner, mingling elements of transparency and public consultation, regulatory impact analysis, harmonization of regulatory
standards, and mutual recognition,59 and this is plausibly due to
the fact that in practice, recent preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) and megaregional agreements have not provided strict organizational separation in terms of treaty design. Others draw a
57
See generally Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–29 (2015)(discussing how new global trends and the
rise of multi-lateral partnerships might pose challenges to domestic regulatory
frameworks); Cf. Cass Sunstein, Reducing Ted Tape: Regulatory Reform Goes International, Blog on Obama White House Archives (May 1, 2012, 11:09 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/05/01/reducing-red-taperegulatory-reform-goes-international [https://perma.cc/KC77-WZMR] (discussing how President Obama’s new Executive Order 13563 “Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review” promotes International Regulatory Cooperation, and in
turn, will help American exports, economic growth, and job creation).
58
See Theodore Posner & David Wolff, Making “Regulatory Coherence” Coherent, Law360 (April 25, 2011) at 3 (“One reason for a bit of skepticism is that the
concept of “regulatory coherence” means different things to different people.
There is no one, commonly accepted understanding of the concept.”). Polanco cited Posner and Wolff and further noted that the introduction of regulatory coherence into international treaty-making poses a number of questions without clear
answers, the most essential being its very definition. “Until we have a more focused understanding of what we mean by regulatory coherence, it will be difficult
to study and measure it as a distinct political phenomenon.” Polanco, supra note
52, at 231.
59
See e.g. Polanco, supra note 52, at 231; Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9,
at 5–8. Sheargold & Mitchell take the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as an example, stating that regulatory coherence is included in the
general idea of “regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers to trade,” which embraces a broad range of elements for international cooperation. Therefore, according
to their interpretation, regulatory coherence may “involve several different aspects: transparency, the efficiency and quality of regulation, and harmonization of
regulatory standards across jurisdiction.” Polanco also noted that, regulatory coherence means substantive regulatory harmonization for some, a harmonization
process for the development and adoption of regulations for others, and mutual
recognition of regulations for still others.
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clear line between the two terms, arguing that regulatory coherence refers to good regulatory practices and provisions alike, while
regulatory cooperation denotes measures aimed at reducing divergence among jurisdictions through methodologies such as mutual
recognition, harmonization, or even joint rulemaking.60
We are of the view that the two concepts indeed have different
focuses and rationales. Regulatory coherence, as analyzed above,
is embedded in democratic accountability and the rule of law, and
is particularly aimed at the reform and discipline of domestic regulatory processes. Regulatory cooperation, on the other hand, is the
process of interaction or partnership between regulators from different governments intended to reduce divergences and increase
interoperability across borders.61 Governments undertake a myriad of regulatory cooperative mechanisms today, ranging from soft
law and private codes, transgovernmental dialogue and networks,
mutual recognition and harmonization, to regional and interna60
See e.g. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Regulatory Spillovers
and the Trading System: From Coherence to Cooperation, THE E15 INITIATIVE
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL TRADE SYSTEM, at 2–3, (April 2015)
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/E15-Regulatory-OPHoekman-and-Mavroidis-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETZ7-9K3S] (discussing
domestic regulation, trade, and international spillovers); see also Marjorie Chorlins Vice Presisent For Eur. Aff. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Address at the Regulatory Coherence and Cooperation in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (July, 15 2015) (discussing the U.S. government’s support for regulatory coherence and cooperation during the TTIP negotiations); Jonathan B. Wiener
& Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a
Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78(4) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
103 (2015) (discussing the challenges and benefits of international regulatory cooperation). It should be noted that some also see regulatory coherence as flipsides
of regulatory divergence, which may also be addressed by way of regulatory cooperation; see Simon Lester & Inu Manak, Addressing Regulatory Trade Barriers in
Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, in MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 337 (Thilo
Rensmann ed., 2017) (addressing how regulatory trade barriers are prompting
states to discuss international regulatory cooperation).
61
See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 60, at 105 (“international regulatory
cooperation denotes a series of steps to coordinate regulation across countries.”);
see also Alberto Alemanno, Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Nation-State? Lessons from International Regulatory Cooperation, in THE GLOBALIZATION
OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 104, 105 (Richard Revesz &
Michael Livermore eds., 2013) (stating that regulatory cooperation often emerges
from the interplay of regulatory reform efforts at the national level and trade liberalization efforts across borders); see also Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 847, 856–57 (2013) (discussing attempts to
promote international regulatory cooperation to reduce “unnecessary differences
in regulatory requirements.”).
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tional agreements, regulatory partnerships between governments,
and joint regulatory institutions.62 Nonetheless, while the definitions of regulatory coherence and regulatory cooperation can be
conceptually separated, the two concepts are by no means practically insulated and mutually exclusive.63 On the contrary, they interact at many levels and are often mutually reinforcing. For instance, regulatory cooperation among governments is an effective
means of mutual learning and of disseminating of good regulatory
practices.64 Likewise, the RIA of a domestic regulation with potential extraterritorial effects may include an assessment of impact on
international trade and burdens on foreign suppliers. Rigorous
regulatory coherence by a government usually translates to transparent, participatory, and accountable rulemaking processes,
which in turn directly benefit, or indirectly serve as fitting infrastructure for, international regulatory cooperation.

62 See OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: RULES FOR A GLOBAL
WORLD 8–10 (Oct 14, 2012) (categorizing eleven types of mechanisms for international regulatory cooperation); see also Bull et al., supra note 57, at 8–12 (outlining
structures of and techniques for international regulatory cooperation); see also
OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL
CHALLENGES 19–74 (2013)(“[S]ynthesiz[ing] the knowledge and evidence . . . on
the various mechanisms used by governments to promote regulatory cooperation.”); OECD, REGULATORY COOPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
17 (1994)(“There is no overall and cross-country consensus yet . . . on the range
and definition of the different mechanisms . . . to promote IRC.”).
63 A boundary case (or an example of practical overlap) may be the transparency requirements under various WTO-covered agreements. The content of the
requirement includes notification and consultation (which is in essence a design
of regulatory coherence), but the objective rests in promoting inter-governmental
regulatory cooperation (as the requirements target the importing Memberexporting Member relationship); see infra the discussion below in this Part on the
WTO transparency requirements.
64
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations
Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 January 1995,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (Mar. 8, 2017), at 9; Committee on Technical Barriers
to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Argument
on Technical Barriers to Trade Under Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13,
2009), paras. 14–15; see also Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 60, at 126 (“Variation
in regulatory approaches can offer an opportunity for learning about policy impacts from differing approaches and, thus, how to improve regulation in the future.”).
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2.2. Normative Diffusion: The Emergence of Regulatory Coherence as
a Governance/Trade Objective at Regional and International
Levels
The United States was primarily responsible for the post-war
architecture of international economic order, which reflected the
American values and governance models of that period.65 As the
following analysis indicates, there has been a notable normative
diffusion, from which regulatory coherence, originally an American concept, has emerged as a trade governance objective at both
regional and multilateral levels.
The APA was enacted during negotiations over the new trading system, when the United States State Department presented the
Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the
United Nations to elaborate on its Proposals for Expansion of
World Trade and Employment in September 1946.66 Article 15 of
the proposed charter was entitled “Publication and Administration
of Trade Regulations—Advanced Notice of Restrictive Regulations,”67 which was subsequently incorporated into the Havana
Charter for the ITO as Article 38 and, without significant revision,
as Article X of the GATT.68 As observed by Ostry, Article X of the
GATT “replicates most of the American approach” to transparency
and public consultation, and the incorporation of such a norm was
not controversial, as “[b]order barriers such as tariffs and quotas
are, for the most part, quite transparent.”69 However, Article X of
the GATT fell short of an effective mechanism to address the challenges brought about by the new “protectionism”—that is, the shift
of protectionist trade policy from tariffs and quotas to “behind-theborder” regulatory barriers to trade.70
Ostry, supra note 18, at 2.
US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1946).
67 Id.
68 See Ostry, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting that although the title of Article X of
the GATT, “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations,” does not include the words “advanced notice of restrictive regulations,” the language of the
Article does not vary considerably from the original US proposal in 1946).
69
Id. at 6–8. Article X of the GATT may be also regarded as an administrative law provision. See Richard B. Stewart et al., The World Trade Organization:
Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 556, 570 (2011)
(arguing that Article X was key to “the emergence of global administrative law.”).
70
As noted earlier, the traditional barriers to trade (tariffs and quotas) have
65
66
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The Uruguay Round, launched in 1986, pushed along some elements of regulatory coherence, which were then incorporated by
the WTO. The vastly expanded transparency requirements in the
covered agreements—which ask WTO members to publish and
give proper notice regarding laws, regulations, and modes of administration—serve as a suitable illustration. Articles X:1 and X:2
of the GATT include transparency requirements, while other
agreements also incorporate similar obligations to publish covered
measures in a timely manner.71 Other notable examples of incorporating regulatory coherence elements include identifying regulatory objectives (Article XX of the GATT,72 Article XIV of the
GATS,73 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement,74 and Annex A of the
declined and non-tariff measures (such as domestic standards and regulations)
have increased as determinants of market access. Domestic regulations are of crucial importance to ensure the environment, public health and safety, and competition, but may unnecessarily impede international trade (especially those without
adequate prior notification or, in some cases, scientific justification). Due to the
gradual shift of protectionism from tariffs to rulemaking (i.e., non-tariff barriers to
trade), subsequent GATT negotiations were not adequately equipped to cope with
non-transparent non-tariff measures. Finally, the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds
brought some improvement to the system, including an emphasis on advance notice and opportunity to inquire and/or comment; Ostry, supra note 18, at 11;
Thomas J. Bollyky, Regulatory Coherence in the TPP Talks, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 171, 172
(Chin L. Lim et al. eds., 2012).
71
See Andrew D. Mitchell et al., Good Governance Obligations in International
Economic Law: A Comparative Analysis of Trade and Investment, 17 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 7, 25 (2016) (charting the good governance requirements for various provisions).
72 GATT, art. XX specifies certain policy objectives that a WTO Member may
resort to as an exception to other GATT obligations. It reads “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (g) relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption . . . .”
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. For a thorough discussion, see Donald H. Regan,
The Meaning of “Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of
Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 347 (2007).
73
Similarly, Article XIV of the GATS lists specific policy goals for WTO
Members to invoke as an exception. “Subject to the requirement that such
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement
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SPS Agreement75) and evaluating the necessity of regulation, considering reasonably available alternatives, and financial and technological capabilities (Article XX of the GATT,76 Article 2.2 of the
TBT Agreement,77 and Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement78).79
The WTO has increasingly recognized that the effective implementation of regulatory coherence can be an important means of
reducing unnecessary barriers to trade, and the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) has demonstrated the
most momentum.80 In 2006, WTO Members formally incorporated
good regulatory practices in the agenda of the TBT Committee,81
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; (b)
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . . . .” General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter
GATS]; see Regan, supra note 72.
74
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art 2.1, Apr. 15 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S 12 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement] ( “Members shall ensure that in
respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any
Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.”).
75
See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Annex A, Apr. 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS
Agreement] (providing four specific objectives that render a governmental measure an SPS measure).
76
GATT, art. XX; see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007),
paras. 145–147 (discussing the evaluation of the effectiveness of a particular regulation.).
77
See TBT Agreement, art. 2.2 (“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical
regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create.”).
78
See SPS Agreement, art. 5.6 (“[W]hen establishing or maintaining sanitary
or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more traderestrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.”).
79
For a more thorough explanation, see e.g. Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note
9, at 603–09 (discussing the purposes of, alternatives to, and justifications for regulation).
80
See generally Thomas J. Bollyky, A Role for the World Trade Organization on
Regulatory Coherence, E15Initiative, at 1(ICTSD & World Economic Forum, Aug.
2015).
81 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Summary Report of the WTO TBT
Workshop on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO Doc. G/TBT/W/287 (June 6, 2008), 1–
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which further encouraged Members to exchange information regarding their implementation experiences.82 Most of these exchanges took place in the Committee’s thematic sessions on good
regulatory practices in March 2013, June 2013, and March 2014.83
The Sixth Triennial Review of the TBT Committee stressed the importance of international regulatory coordination and agreed to
identify a non-exhaustive list of voluntary mechanisms and principles of good regulatory practice.84 The most recent Triennial Review in 2015 further discussed regional initiatives pertaining to
good regulatory practices and specifically referred to the 2005
APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform (see the
discussion below), which encourages APEC members to adopt a
holistic approach to the development of regulations.85 On balance,
the TBT Committee has recognized that:
Good Regulatory Practices (GRP) can contribute to the improved and effective implementation of the substantive obligations under the TBT Agreement. Effective implementation through best practices is seen as an important means of
avoiding unnecessary obstacles to trade. Institutionalizing
the various mechanisms, processes, and procedures of GRP
through laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as through
the creation and designation of institutions within Member
governments to oversee regulatory processes, is seen as a
28; see Bollyky, supra note 70, at 178–79 (discussing the benefits of “an integrated
approach to regulatory coherence.”).
82
See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under
Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 19, 2009), 5–6 (discussing recommendations to facilitate trade through the exchange of information).
83 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO Doc. G/TBT/GEN/143 (Mar. 11, 2013); Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Second Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO
Doc. G/TBT/GEN/143/Add.1 (June 25, 2013); Committee on Technical Barriers
to Trade, Third Thematic Session on Good Regulatory Practice, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/GEN/143/Add.2 (Mar. 18–19, 2014).
84 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Sixth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/32 (Nov. 29, 2012), para. 4. The triennial reviews are
carried out in accordance with the mandate under Article 15.4 of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade.
85
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Seventh Triennial Review of the
Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under
Article 15.4, WTO Doc. G/TBT/37 (Dec. 3, 2015), at 3–4.
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means of giving effect to GRP. Effective internal policy coordination, including among regulators, standardizing bodies and trade officials implementing the TBT Agreement, is
stressed. Additionally, regulatory cooperation between
Members is an effective means of disseminating GRP.86
Beyond the WTO, there has also been growing recognition and
use of regulatory coherence in many other countries, as well as in
some PTAs.87 Indeed, the deregulation and regulatory relief mindset in the aforesaid aspects of United States administrative law
have “evolved over time into a broader agenda of regulatory reform and good regulatory practices” that strive to promote transparency, cost-effectiveness, quality, and efficiency in regulatory actions.88 Such an agenda of regulatory coherence has subsequently
been embraced in many other developed countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.89 The internationalization of regulatory
impact analysis has been further observed by many commentators
86
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations
Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 of January 1995:
Note by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (Mar. 8, 2017), 6; see also
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation
and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/26 (Nov. 13, 2009), paras. 8–9 and 14 (discussing the value of
good regulatory practices).
87
See Bollyky, supra note 70, at 177–78 (noting that this phenomenon was
aligned with the context of the regulatory reform movement which can be traced
back to the deregulation and regulatory relief initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s);
see also Council of the OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance (March 22, 2012), at 8 (discussing OECD’s recommendations
for the implementation, evaluation, and purpose of regulations).
88
Bollyky, supra note 70, at 177–78; see also Scott Jacobs & Peter Ladegaard,
Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries, Washington, D.C. (International
Finance Corporation, 2010), at vii (discussing the promotion of “a regulatory system that is effective, efficient, transparent, and accessible.”).
89
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1260–39 (2007) (discussing Reagan-era centralized review of regulations); see also Rosalyn Bell, Regulatory Impact Analysis:
Australia’s Experience, Presentation delivered at the OECD Regulatory Reform
Workshop,
Stockholm
(June
3–4,
2013),
at
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Breakout-session-2Rosalyn%20Bell-RIA-Australia's-experience.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTY2-HGBV]
(last visited May 30, 2017) (discussing the results of a study conducted by the Australian Productivity Commission); NEW ZEALAND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION,
REPORT
ON
REGULATORY
INSTITUTIONS
AND
PRACTICES,
http://www.productivity.govt.nz/sites/default/files/regulatory-institutionsand-practices-final-resort.pef [https://perma.cc/MA49-PPBR] (discussing regulatory reform in New Zealand).
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around the world, covering the adoption of RIA, ongoing discussions, and varied practices in countries and regions such as the
United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Mexico, East Africa, and Southeast
Europe.90 In addition, while existing PTAs do not usually include
a chapter devoted to regulatory coherence, provisions related to
some elements of the concept (such as strengthened transparency
requirements) are well represented to ensure that trading partners
are informed of developments in relevant regulations and standards.91 Examples of a generally applicable notice-and-comment requirement, as well as a review mechanism, can also be found in
PTAs such as, inter alia, the Korea–United States Free Trade
Agreement (Chapter 21),92 the Peru–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Chapter 15),93 and the New Zealand–China Free Trade
Agreement (Chapter 13).94 Furthermore, some commentators have
observed the growing practice of including transparency obligations in investment agreements, including the US Model BIT
(2012).95
Remarkably, both the concept of regulatory coherence and the
regulatory reform agenda have been embraced by numerous international and intergovernmental organizations, including the
APEC, OECD, and World Bank, as promoting the rule of law, trade
and development, and as a more effective and efficient approach to
public policy objectives.96 Among these intergovernmental efforts,
90
See REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT TOWARDS BETTER REGULATION? 10–15
(Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker eds., 2007) (discussing the use of RIA in developed and developing countries).
91 See Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 594 (discussing transparency and
mutual recognition provisions in PTAs).
92 Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor–U.S., June 30, 2007.
93 Free Trade Agreement, Peru–Sing., May 29, 2008.
94 Free Trade Agreement, N.Z.–China, Apr. 7, 2008.
95 Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 593.
96 See relevant discussion in Bollyky, supra note 70, at 172–73; see also OECD,
Regulatory Policy and Governance 41–57 (“Regulatory policy has already made a
significant contribution to economic development and societal well-being.”);
World Bank, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World,
(International Finance Corporation/World Bank Group), at 16–25 (discussing the
effects of regulations and regulatory reform on social and economic outcomes);
World Bank, Simplification of Business Regulation at the Subnational Level: A Reform Implementation Toolkit for Project Teams (International Finance Corporation/World Bank Group) v-1, at 4–7 (2006) (describing the benefits of regulatory
simplification); see also OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to Regulatory Governance 28 (2002) (reporting recent economic
success of certain countries as a result of “the adoption of coherent and effective
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one prominent and comprehensive instrument is the 2005 APECOECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform (APEC-OECD
Checklist), designed as a voluntary tool for governments to utilize
“to evaluate their respective regulatory reform efforts.”97 Arguably, previous efforts to promote regulatory coherence converged in
the APEC/OECD,98 which further advanced the discourse—and
negotiations, such as those in TPP—at various levels.
The APEC-OECD Checklist is the product of the cooperative
initiative on regulatory reform undertaken by the APEC and the
OECD and launched during the 2000 Ministerial Conference in
Brunei Darussalam, with the objectives of advancing regulatory
quality, efficiency, transparency, accountability, economic growth,
and market openness.99 Based on the pooled experience and
knowledge of the APEC and the OECD, the Checklist underscores
key issues to be considered throughout the entire regulatory process, from development to implementation, while “recognizing
that the diversity of economic, social, and political environments
and values of member economies require flexibility in the methods.”100 With regard to the horizontal criteria for regulatory reregulatory policy.”).
97
APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist on Regulatory Reform 1 (2005). Some
commentators regard APEC and the OECD as the key drivers for the promotion
of regulatory coherence, which “has emerged mainly within international networks of governance.” Polanco, supra note 52, at 231. Others also note that the
OECD and the APEC have been promoting regulatory reform for decades, and
some of their efforts have included approaches to improving domestic regulatory
processes that can facilitate international trade and investment. Sheargold &
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 590.
98
APEC has focused on the promotion of high-quality regulatory environment, transparency, efficiency, and unnecessary burdens to promote economic
development and trade in the Asia-Pacific region since its establishment. In 1994,
APEC created a Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance to promote the
elimination of trade distortions arising from inefficiency, unnecessary, or conflicting regulations and standards among member economies. Bollyky, supra note 70,
at 181. OECD countries were the earliest movers to take actions to improve their
regulatory systems, as over half of the OECD countries had by 1996 adopted RIA,
which was further noted in 2009 as one of the most widely used processes for improving the quality of rulemaking processes. Polanco, supra note 52, at 234–35;
Scott H. Jacobs, An Overview of Regulatory Impact Analysis in OECD Countries, in
REGULATORY IMPACT STUDIES: BEST PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 13 (OECD ed.,
1997); OECD, Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Tool for Policy Coherence 13
(OECD, 2009).
99
The APEC-OECD Checklist comprises of four pillars: regulatory reform,
regulatory policies, competition policy, and market liberalization policies. APECOECD Checklist, at 1–36.
100 APEC-OECD Checklist, preamble.
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form, the Checklist highlights the use of RIA in the regulatory process, as well as the need for an integrated system that supports and
coordinates all sectors of the government.101 Effective interministerial systems for managing and coordinating regulatory efforts, preferably a central body or an institutionalized mechanism,
are strongly recommended.102 However, the APEC-OECD Checklist acknowledges the following:
It is often difficult for regulators to reform themselves.
Special interests, close identification with the objectives of
outdated regulation, and countervailing pressures from different parts of society make such self-reform even more
complex. In addition, modern regulations and regimes apply across multiple areas. Regulatory quality control and
consistency may benefit when responsibility is shared between regulators and a central quality control entity.103
Therefore, it is critical that governments have clearly defined
regulatory coherence principles that guide them in formulating
good regulatory practices. Toward this end, the Checklist also emphasizes transparency and public consultation, as well as the benefits to stakeholders as well as regulators, as reflected in the aforementioned United States administrative law. According to the
instrument, “appropriate and well-publicised procedures for effective and timely inputs from interested national and foreign parties”
advance the quality of rulemaking and reduce compliance costs for
stakeholders.104 According to Bollyky, since the APEC and the
OECD embrace the concepts of transparency and public consultation, and expand the scope of participation to cover all interested
persons across borders and bureaucratic levels, they remain among
the most difficult points of regulatory coherence to understand and
implement.105 Finally, the APEC-OECD Checklist emphasizes the
rule of law and its international dimension, stating “[it] means that
all properly functioning regulatory systems and every regulatory
action . . . must be based in law,” and suggests that member governments evaluate the conformity of their proposed regulations
101
102
103
104
105

APEC-OECD Checklist, at 9.
APEC-OECD Checklist, at 9 and 15; see also Bollyky, supra note 70, at 237.
APEC-OECD Checklist, at 15.
APEC-OECD Checklist, at 17.
Bollyky, supra note 70, at 238.
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with international commitments, especially relevant WTO obligations.106 This approach strongly echoes our argument that the two
concepts, regulatory coherence and regulatory cooperation, are often interactive and mutually reinforcing.107
The 2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration dedicated a section and
an annex to regulatory convergence and cooperation, with the aim
of eliminating unjustifiably burdensome and outdated regulations,
increasing productivity and jobs, and protecting the environment,
public health, safety, and security.108 Annex D required member
economies to take specific steps to implement good regulatory
practices: to ensure internal coordination of regulatory work
among trade, standards, and regulatory agencies by an institutionalized method; to incorporate the element of RIA in the regulatory
process (specifically, the evaluation of less restrictive alternatives);
and to adopt transparency and public consultation procedures
pursuant to the APEC-OECD Integrated Checklist.109 Notably, the
Declaration also touched upon some aspects of regulatory cooperation, emphasizing that “greater alignment in regulatory approaches, including to international standards, is necessary to prevent
needless barriers to trade from stifling economic growth and employment.”110
Efforts in the APEC-OECD forum have propelled the inclusion
of a full chapter devoted to regulatory coherence in TPP, which
represents a major development in this global normative diffusion.111 The TPP is the first megaregional agreement to incorporate
106
See APEC-OECD Checklist, at 15 (“[e]very well functioning rule-making
process will have a procedure for examining the proposed regulatory action for
legality and compliance with other requirements, such as adherence to WTO obligations.”).
107 In the previous section we offer an example, where the RIA of a domestic
regulation with potential extraterritorial effects may include the assessment of
impact on international trade and burdens on foreign suppliers; see supra Part
II.A.
108
2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration, Honolulu, Hawaii, United States (Nov
12–13, 2011).
109
2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration, Annex D, Strengthening Implementation of Good Regulatory Practices, Honolulu, Hawaii, United States (Nov 12–13,
2011).
110 2011 APEC Leaders’ Declaration.
111
TPP, Chapter 25. The Chapter is highlighted as an achievement of PTA
negotiation to eliminate unnecessary regulatory barriers and to make the regulatory systems of TPP parties more compatible and transparent. For a concise discussion, see Ian Fergusson & Bruce Vaughn, The Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (CRS Report for Congress No. R40502, Congressional Research Ser-
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all of the elements of regulatory coherence, primarily due to the
fact that all of the TPP Parties are also APEC members and have
previously agreed upon the relevance and importance of improving regulatory processes at the global level.112 The TPP Chapter on
Regulatory Coherence requires Parties to implement good regulatory practices in their rulemaking processes for a more effective
and efficient achievement of their policy objectives, as well as the
facilitation of international trade, investment, economic growth,
and employment.113 While the Chapter leaves the scope of application up to the Parties to determine, they are expected to achieve
“significant coverage” of regulatory measures.114 The Regulatory
Coherence Chapter explicitly refers to good regulatory practices
intended to discipline government actions throughout the rulemaking process. Good regulatory practices apply to the planning,
design, issuance, implementation, and review of covered regulatory measures, where Parties must enhance stakeholder engagement,
respond to comments, and explain regulatory rationale, and review and revise regulatory measures.115 The regulatory coherence
rules in TPP include, more specifically, notice and comment procedures, stakeholder participation, duty to explain, access to information, and mutual consultation. With enhanced stakeholder involvement (comment, response, and consultation) and Parties’
commitment to conduct ex-post assessments, potential causes of
trade disputes may be identified and addressed at earlier stages,
which in turn reduces the likelihood of unpleasant surprises and
trade conflicts after a measure is adopted and implemented. The
increased transparency and predictability in the rulemaking process may also help Parties prevent unnecessary disputes, resolve
vice, Dec 12, 2011), at 8.
112
See Thomas J. Bollyky, Better Regulation for Freer Trade (Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 22), at 2–3.
113 TPP, Article 25.2.
114 TPP, Article 25.3.
115 TPP, Articles 25.5.6, 25.5.7, and 25.8. For a discussion on the implications
of the TPP Regulatory Coherence Chapter, see Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9,
at 597–600 (“While these provisions may provide a framework for future integration and the reduction of regulatory divergence among TPP parties, in their current form they are very general provisions, which provide little specificity or concrete vision for what that future cooperation might entail.”). Yet Sheargold and
Mitchell suggest that the novelty and significance lie in the TPP’s reference to
good regulatory practices in the treaty language in relation to the regulatory autonomy of governments. Id.
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frictions within a definite timeframe, and avoid lengthy and costly
dispute settlement. Notably, a Party to TPP “shall endeavour to
ensure that it has processes or mechanisms to facilitate the effective
interagency coordination and review of proposed covered regulatory measures,” preferably by establishing a central coordinating
body.116 While the detailed institutional arrangements are left to
each TPP Party, it seems clear that such a provision was introduced
by the United States with the model of the OIRA in mind.117
The above is an endeavor to trace the contours of the emergence of global regulatory coherence, from administrative law in
the United States to other jurisdictions, international organizations
(such as the WTO, APEC, and OECD), and trade agreements. The
most recent evidence—the above-named TPP chapter—
significantly transforms the relatively voluntary nature of regulatory coherence at the international level (as APEC-OECD best practices) to a potentially enforceable treaty obligation to actively
launch processes and create mechanisms (whatever room for discretion is left to the Parties to determine their preferred methodology or institutional design).118 Intriguingly, as a key player in the
domain of international trade, China has arguably remained rather
silent and indifferent in the entire course of development.119 Such
a state of play surely merits further analysis of the unique Chinese
context, as well as its interaction with the recent initiative on regulatory coherence, to which we now turn.
3. CHINA’S EVOLVING REGULATORY REGIME IN A GLOBALIZED
WORLD
3.1. Legal and Institutional Reform: Early Efforts in the Pre- and
Post-WTO Era

TPP, art. 25.4.1.
Sheargold & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 598; Bollyky, supra note 70, at 181;
Fergusson & Vaughn, supra note 111, at 37.
118
TPP, arts. 25.3, 25.4.2, 25.5, 25.7.1, and 25.11; see also Jane Kelsey, Preliminary Analysis of the Draft TPP Chapter on Domestic Coherence 5 (Citizens Trade
Campaign, Oct 23, 2011) (discussing obligations under TPP proposal).
119 As the time of writing, we are not aware of any active step taken by China
to embrace or promote the elements of regulatory coherence at both domestic and
international levels.
116
117
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Any meaningful discussion of China’s regulatory-based trade
barriers, corresponding reforms, and approaches to regulatory coherence will inevitably touch upon limits on government activities.
Such limits are often embedded in the Chinese administrative law
regime and are closely intertwined with the notion of the “rule of
law.” The notion of rule of law has been highly contested in contemporary China.120 Although the founding fathers of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) seemed to embrace this idea by requiring
civil servants to act according to law and serve the people’s interests, since the nation’s first constitution in 1954,121 the Cultural
Revolution and other episodes in Maoist China revealed the ruling
elites’ preference for “governance through mass movements, campaigns, and charismatic appeals,” rejecting “governance through
law.”122 For Mao, the concept of law and a legal system may have
run counter to the revolution; what China needed was not “the
120
It is argued that long before the PRC was established, the notion of rule
of law and administrative laws have been part of China’s legal system, though
their purpose was to ensure that government officials faithfully carried out the
Emperors’ orders; see THE GREAT QING CODE 1–11 (William C. Jones trans., 1994)
(highlighting the history and development of rule and law practices in China);
Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 Berkeley J.
Int’l. L. 161, 186 (2001) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and
Rule of Law in the PRC] (discussing ongoing shifts in China’s administrative legal
regime and the extent to which it has been influenced by globalization). For a recount of rule of law in China after 1949, see Hungdah Chiu, The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law, in Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in CONTEMP.
ASIAN STUD., 6–8 (No. 4–1985); Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 43 (2001); Jerome Alan Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in
THE BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323 (George Hicks ed, 1990); Pak
K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 43 (2005).
121
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Const.] art. 18 (1954) (“All
servants of the state must be loyal to the people’s democratic system, observe the
Constitution and the law and strive to serve the people.”). The 1954 Constitution
was later superseded by those promulgated in 1975, 1978, and 1982, respectively.
The 1982 Constitution is the current constitution, which has been amended in
1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.
122 See John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 103 136–37 (2006) (highlighting the evolution of China’s integration of administrative law and its role in private life). During the Cultural Revolution, for instance, “the few open law schools were closed
and the law faculty sent to labor camps,” while “law libraries and books were destroyed by the Red Guard.” The legal profession, as James M. Zimmermann remarks, “disappeared overnight, and almost no laws were enacted and no law
books published” at the time. JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 53 (4th ed., 2014).
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rule of law,” but “the rule of individuals.”123 Moreover, the rule of
law is often seen as having its root in liberal Western democracies,
which contradicts the ideology shaped by the Chinese Communist
Party.124
Nevertheless, the late 1970s witnessed a sea change. In the
post-Mao era, for Deng Xiao Ping and other leaders, the legitimacy
of single-party socialism was largely dependent upon the nation’s
survival and prosperity, which in turn hinged on sustainable economic development.125 These objectives were not going to be
achieved with Mao’s rule of man, but with a modernized legal system that would help China “gain the confidence of the global
community” and “ensure the institutionalization of economic reform.”126 In a crucial step toward this end, the PRC passed the
1982 Constitution, which restored its legal system by including,
among other provisions, administration in accordance with law
(e.g., administrative procedures, right to sue, compensation),127 the
supremacy of the law,128 and equality of all before the law.129 Since
then, China’s administrative law legislation has, albeit slowly, begun to flourish. More than 130 pieces of administrative legislation
were passed between 1982 and 1988.130 In 1989, after almost a decade of legal reform, China promulgated its Administrative Litiga123 See WILLEM VAN KEMENADE, CHINA, HONG KONG, TAIWAN, INC. 262 (Diane
Webb trans., 1997); Jerome Alan Cohen, Tiananmen and the Rule of Law, in THE
BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 323, 325 (George Hicks ed., 1990) (describing Mao as “the modern world’s most famous proponent of lawlessness.”).
124
See, e.g., Richard Flathman, Liberalism and the Suspect Enterprise of Political
Institutionalization: the Case of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 297 (Ian Shapiro
ed., 1994) (examining the liberal philosophical underpinnings of many approaches
to the rule of law). However, some scholars think that democracy should be conceptually separated from the principles of rule of law. See, e.g., William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 742; Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in
China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 49 (2001).
125
See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 161, 163 (2001) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Globalization, Path
Dependency and the Limits of Law] (acknowledging the impact of globalization in
China’s refocusing of its administrative legal priorities).
126 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 122, at 53.
127 See, e.g., Xianfa [Constitution], art. 2, 5, 41 (1982) (P.R.C).
128 Id. at art. 5.
129 Id. at art. 23.
130
See FENG LIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES IN CHINA
116 (1996) (providing a review of notable developments in China’s administrative
legal framework).
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tion Law, which signaled the Chinese leadership’s endorsement of
law-based administration.131
The pace of administrative law legislation accelerated in the
1990s. This trajectory mirrors, in part, Chinese leaders’ focus on
the transition to a “socialist economy,”132 and in part, the anticipation of China’s accession to the WTO. While China moved toward
a market-oriented economy in the process of globalization, a more
predictable, accountable, and rule-based system of administration
was needed. As a corollary, a number of administrative laws were
enacted to, on one hand, “rationalize governance, enhance administrative efficiency, and rein in local governments,” and, on the
other, to “respond[ ] to people’s demands for greater protection of
their rights and interests” in order to address emerging challenges.133 The passage of the Administrative Supervision Regulations
(1990),134 the Administrative Reconsideration Regulations (1990),135
the State Compensation Law (1994),136 and the Administrative Penalties Law (1996)137 are prime examples. The former two pieces
were, moreover, upgraded to laws in 1997 and 1999, respectively.138
131
Xingzheng Susong Fa [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) (P.R.C.) (highlighting the
Chinese Government’s approach to codifying its domestic administrative law).
Administrative Litigation Law was amended in November 2014. For a recount of
China’s judicial reform, see PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW,
supra note 11, at 239–79.
132
Xianfa [Constitution], art. 7 (1993) (P.R.C.) (expressing China’s commitment to its socialist economy).
133
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW 399 (2002)
[hereinafter Peerenboom, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW].
134
Xingzheng jiancha tiao li [Administrative Supervision Regulations]
(promulgated by State Council, Dec. 9, 1990) (P.R.C.).
135
Xingzheng fuyi tiao li [Administrative Reconsideration Regulations]
(promulgated by Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, Dec. 24,
1990) (P.R.C).
136
Guojia peichang fa [State Compensation Law] (promulgated by National
People’s Congress Standing Committee, May 12, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995)
(P.R.C.).
137
Xingzheng chufa fa [Administrative Penalties Law] (promulgated by National People’s Congress, Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996) (P.R.C.).
138
Xingzheng jiancha fa [Administrative Supervision Law] (promulgated by
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, May 9, 1997, effective May 9,
1997) (P.R.C); Xingzheng fuyi fa [Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Apr. 29, 1999, effective
Oct. 1, 1999) (P.R.C.).
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Even more dramatic administrative law reforms took place following China’s WTO accession in 2001. Without repeating the
WTO’s implications for China’s domestic governance—which has
been addressed extensively elsewhere139—we instead focus on institutional reforms with a direct bearing on those key elements of
regulatory coherence noted above.
3.1.1. Transparency and Public Consultation
Transparency is one of the core disciplines under the WTO, requiring Members to promptly publish all trade-related laws, regulations, and other government measures of general application before their implementation.140 When compared to its Western
counterpart, such a requirement was largely missing in China’s
administrative tradition. Thus, China was required to bolster its
transparency obligations while negotiating its accession into the
WTO. Broadly, the Accession Protocol expanded China’s transparency obligations via two specific measures. First, China is required to enforce laws, regulations, or other measures that have
been published.141 Second, China is required to make all laws, reg139 See, e.g., Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment and Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 720 (2007) [hereinafter Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System]; CHIEN-HUEI WU, WTO AND THE
GREATER CHINA: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2012) [hereinafter WU, WTO AND THE GREATER CHINA]; Chien-Huei Wu, How Does TRIPs Transform Chinese Administrative Law? 8 (1) GLOBAL JURIST 1 (2008); Ljiljana Biukovic,
Selective Adaption of WTO Transparency Norms and Local Practices in China and Japan,
11 (4) J. INT’L. ECON. L. 803(2008). For the most recent and comprehensive account
of China’s trade law capacity building, see Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s
Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO (UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper
No. 2017-15), [https://perma.cc/T4KB-UGHV].
140
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Trade in
Services arts. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, art. 63, April 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
141
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 10 November 2001,
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, para. 2.(c).1.,
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Accession Protocol] (“China undertakes
that only those laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting
trade in goods, services, TRIPs or the control of foreign exchange that are published and readily available to other WTO Members, individuals and enterprises,
shall be enforced[.]”).
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ulations, and other measures falling within the aegis of the WTO
available through an official journal on a regular basis and respond
to requests for information within a prescribed time frame.142
Several instruments were adopted in the 2000s in response to
these demands. The Legislation Law, promulgated in 2000, broke
new ground by establishing a modernized administrative scheme.
It also contributed to transparency in at least two ways. First, China’s legal system has long been viewed as a black box with no clear
hierarchy between laws, regulations, and many other normative
documents. Past practice revealed that various “internal documents”—which should, in theory, have no binding effect—can be
as equally effective as laws.143 Thus, the Legislation Law brought
order to the normative chaos by clarifying the jurisdictions of the
various authorities and establishing a standardized rulemaking
process.144 Second, the Legislation Law fulfilled China’s obligation
under the Accession Protocol by requiring laws, regulations, and
other measures to be published in government gazettes.145 The
Legislation Licensing Law, enacted in 2003, followed in the same
vein by requiring the public disclosure of notable regulations on
administrative licensing and prohibiting those that remained undisclosed from forming the basis of implementation of administrative licensing.146 Moreover, save for concerns regarding national
security, commercial secrets, and privacy, the Administrative Licensing Law required the government to disclose implementation
of administrative licensing and the results thereof.147 Shortly
thereafter, in 2004, the State Council, in a guiding document called
“Implementation Outline to Comprehensively Move Forward
Id. paras. 2(c)2–3.
Xiaoxiao Li, Adaption to WTO Standards: Changes and Adjustments to Business Laws and Regulations, in MODERN CHINESE LEGAL REFORM: NEW PERSPECTIVES
151, 154–55 (XiaoBing Li & Qiang Fang eds., 2013) (noting that “China habitually
went beyond the publicly announced laws and regulations to develop a number
of 'internal decisions' or 'official documents,' which became more important than
the laws.”).
144 Lifa Fa Legislation Law arts. 1, 7 (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong.,
Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000; amended in Mar. 15, 2015); see also
Ohnesorge, supra note 122, at 138 (discussing, in Part III. A. 3, the evolution and
standardizing effect of the Legislative Law on China’s domestic administrative
framework).
145 Legislation Law, supra note 144, arts. 52, 62, 70.
146 Xingzheng xuke fa [Administrative Licensing Law] (adopted by Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004.) art. 5.
147 Id.
142
143
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Administration According to the Law,” again underscored the importance of transparency in ensuring rule-based administration
across government agencies at all levels.148
Moreover, as part of its WTO-Plus obligations under the Accession Protocol, China went beyond the passive information disclosure requirements by providing “a reasonable period for comment
to the appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented,” with exceptions for certain situations.149 China’s efforts
can best be exemplified, once again, by the Legislation Law, which
committed China to “openness” by accommodating “people’s participation in legislative activities through various channels” since
its promulgation in 2000.150 Several follow-up initiatives have also
been developed with this goal. In 2001, the State Council issued
the “Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations”151 and “Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules”152 to implement the Legislation Law. While the
Legislation Law offered comment opportunities in general, these
two rules set forth detailed procedural requirements for government agencies to engage stakeholders. Generally, in drafting administrative regulations and rules, drafting agencies should solicit
the opinions of relevant agencies, organizations, and citizens
through symposia, panel discussions, hearings, or otherwise.153
Next, when draft regulations and rules are submitted for approval
by supervisory bodies, an introductory note regarding how these

148
Quanmian tuijin yifa xingzheng shishi gangyao [Implementation Outline
to Comprehensively Move Forward Administration According to the Law] [hereinafter 2004 Implementation Outline] (adopted by the State Council, Mar. 22,
2004).
149 Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2.(C).
150
Legislation Law, supra note 144, art. 5.
151
Xíngzheng fagui zhiding chengxu tiaoli [Regulations on Procedures for
the Formulation of Administrative Regulations] (issued by the State Council, Nov.
16, 2001, effective on Jan. 1, 2002) art. 11.
152
Guizhang zhiding chengxu tiaoli [Regulations on Procedures for the
Formulation of Rules] (issued by the State Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective on Jan.
1, 2002).
153 See, e.g., id., arts. 14–15 (“Practical experience should be summed up, and
the opinions of relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be extensively
listened to.”); Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Regulations, supra note 151, art. 12 (“Practical experience should be summed up,
and the opinions of relevant organs, organizations and citizens shall be extensively solicited.”).
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opinions are addressed is needed.154 There might be a second
chance for public comment at the approval stage if the draft for
approval involves, in the case of regulations, “major or difficult issues,” “immediate interests of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations,” or important matters approved by the State Council,155 and, in the case of rules, “major issues.”156 Similar procedural
requirements were also included in the Administrative Licensing
Law and the 2004 Implementation Outline: the former required the
incorporation of some sort of public consultation in laws and/or
regulations relating to administrative licensing,157 while the latter
underscored the importance of due process by protecting stakeholders’ right to information, comment, and remedy.158

3.1.2. Regulatory Impact Analysis
Although regulatory impact analysis was not included in its
WTO-Plus obligations, China also took steps to revise its administrative laws to incorporate certain elements of RIA. A good illustration of such steps is the above-mentioned Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations and
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Rules. Under the former, for instance, agencies were required to
delineate key issues and the manner in which the proposed project
addressed them before the State Council included the project in its
annual work plan at the beginning of each year.159 Moreover, at
154
See, e.g., Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra
note 152, art. 25 (“A draft rule and its explanation shall be signed by the principal
responsible person of the legislative affairs office, who shall put forward a proposal that the draft rule and its explanation be submitted to the relevant meeting .
. . for deliberation.”).
155 Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations, supra note 151, arts. 19, 21, 22.
156 Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 152,
arts. 21, 23 (“Legislative affairs offices shall send draft rules for examination . . . to
relevant organs, organizations and experts to solicit their opinions.”).
157
Administrative Licensing Law, supra note 145, art. 19 (“Where an administrative
license is to be established by means of drafting a law . . . the drafting entity shall consult the opinions through hearing
and argumentation[.]”).
158
2004 Implementation Outline, supra note 148, para. 5.
159 Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations, supra note 151, arts. 6–8 (articulating the procedure for preparing an annual
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the drafting stage, the administrative agencies were to follow the
principles that administrative regulations represented, including
“scientifically regulating administrative acts, promoting the shift of
government functions toward economic adjustment, social management and public service.”160 Thus, agencies were to conduct
“in-depth investigations and researches [sic]” during the drafting
process and explain the “necessity” of such regulation for the State
Council’s examination.161 These mandates were later underscored
by the 2004 Implementation Outline, which directs government
agencies to formulate a “science-based” administrative decisionmaking process to improve administrative efficiency.162 The 2004
Implementation Outline requires drafting agencies to choose the
option that is least harmful to the people when multiple scenarios
can serve the same administrative purpose.163 Moreover, the 2004
Implementation Outline instructs that, as a systemic matter, government agencies should take into account not only the ex-ante
costs of the rulemaking process, but also ex-post social costs and
law enforcement expenses by exploring cost-effective analysis
mechanisms of government legislation—especially those related to
economic affairs.164
3.1.2.1. Interagency Coordination and Compatibility
One of the problems facing China’s trading partners is the
complicated way in which its rulemaking authority is exercised.
Since China’s economic reform in 1978, the emphasis on rulemaking and the rule of law has contributed to a significant expansion
in the promulgation of normative documents at all levels of government.165 Because several entities were vested with the power to
legislate, the rulemaking arena was described as a “bewildering
and inconsistent array of laws, regulations, provisions, measures,
legislation working plan).
160 Id. art. 11.1.
161
Id. arts. 12, 16.
162 2004 Implementation Outline, supra note 148, §§ 2.2, 3.5.
163 See id. § 3.5.
164
See id. § 6.17.
165
See Laura Paler, China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly
and Representative Legislative System, THE CHINA Q., 302 (2005) (examining “the significance of the Legislation Law (lifa la), passed by the National People’s Congress
(NPC) in March 2000.”).
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directives, notices, decisions, and explanations, all claiming to be
normatively binding and treated as such by the creating entity.”166
These normative documents resulted in numerous contradictions,
tensions, and ambiguities within the rulemaking system, which
slowed economic development and undermined the confidence of
citizens and foreign investors in the legal system.167 Such concerns
were intensified by China’s WTO accession.168 To address these
concerns, China was required by the Accession Protocol to administer all of the laws, regulations, and other measures of central and
local governments in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner,” and invalidate all local rules and measures inconsistent with
its WTO obligations.169 As a result, China embarked upon a series
of clean-up campaigns. In October 2001, the State Council began to
review 756 administrative regulations issued before the end of
2000—71 of which were invalidated—and required local governments to address rules and measures incompatible with the WTO
disciplines.170 Within three years of its WTO accession, China revised or terminated nearly 190,000 local rules and measures; by
2005, some 3,000 laws, regulations, and rules were also amended.171
The sweeping institutional reform went beyond the review of
existing legal frameworks. To restore the order of the rulemaking
166 Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the PRC, supra
note 120, at 205; see, e.g., Jan Michiei Otto & Yuwen Li, An Overview of Lawmaking
in China, in LAWMAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1, 1–18 (Jan Michiel
Otto et al. eds., 2000) (highlighting China’s evolution from a ‘non-law’ system to a
system with a robust legislative program).
167 See Perry Keller, Source of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 711
(1994) (discussing the complexity and inconsistency within China’s legal system
and their effects on the reliable application of the law).
168 Qin, The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, supra note 139, at
736. In China, entrenched localism, from time to time, resulted in local rules that
contradict with laws and regulations passed by the central government. Thus,
these special commitments were included to harness local protectionism.
169 Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (A).
170
See, e.g., SANG BAICHUAN ET AL. (桑百川等合着), TONGCHOU GUONEI
（统筹国内发展和对外开放）[COORDINATING
FAZHAN
HE
DUIWAI
KAIFANG
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT AND OPEN-UP] 31 (2011).
171 Wan Xuezhong（万学忠）& Zhang Wei（张维), Rushi shi nian tuidong
zhongguo fazhi Jincheng（入世十年推动中国法治进程 [To Promote the Rule of
Law in Ten Years of the WTO Accession], NEWSLETTER OF THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
OFFICE
OF
THE
STATE
COUNCIL
(Dec.
9,
2011),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/201112/09/content_3185561.htm [https://perma.cc/MJP2-CKML] (last visited: Apr.
25, 2017).
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paradigm, Chinese leaders adopted a forward-looking approach
by delimiting the jurisdiction of each rulemaking body and formulating a method to address multi-level legislative conflicts in the
Legislation Law. In addition to spelling out the hierarchical legal
order supporting the Constitution,172 the Legislation Law drew a
clear division between the rulemaking power of the National People’s Congress and other entities by specifying ten broad areas exclusively governed by laws, while underscoring the primacy of the
National People’s Congress through the right to annul normative
documents of central administrative bodies or local governments
found to be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws.173 Given
the long-simmering frustrations over confusion and ambiguities
within the legal system, much of the design of the Legislation Law
can be seen as a pushback from the National People’s Congress to
harness “the rush of administrative regulations issued by governments at various levels” and the ramifications that followed.174
Later, the Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of
Administrative Regulations and the Regulations on Procedures for
the Formulation of Rules both set forth detailed requirements to
avoid potential conflicts inherent in the multi-level rulemaking
process. The former, for instance, seemed to adopt the APA model
by coordinating rulemaking initiatives through annual working
plans. Article 7 provides in relevant part:
Where the relevant departments of the State Council deem
that there is a need to formulate administrative regulations,
they shall . . . state the main issues to be solved by such projects, the guidelines and policies that such projects are
based on and the main systems to be established by such
projects.175
172
At the top of the pyramid is Constitution, followed by “falu” (laws,
promulgated by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee),
“fagui” (regulations, enacted by the State Council and the sub-national people’s
congress), and “guizhang” (rules, issued by central government ministries and
local governments). Legislation Law, supra note 144, arts. 78–82.
173
See Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing Legislative
Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative Harmony, 26 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 139, 191–217 (2013) (articulating the practical difficulty of addressing legislative disorder and suggesting what can be done). The earliest efforts to create
such a system can be dated back to the 1982 Constitution and certain organic laws.
174
See Paler, supra note 165, at 308 (citing NPC Commission to Formulate
Legislation Law, Xinhua, 25 October 1999).
175 Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regula-
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Such control also existed in the drafting stage. Article 13 of the
Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Regulations, for instance, required the drafting agency to “reach a
consensus with other departments on the provisions that involve
their powers and responsibilities or the provisions that are closely
related to them.”176 In cases in which consensus was not reached
after “sufficient consultation,” the drafting agency was obliged to
“state the circumstances of and the reasons for such non-consensus
when submitting the draft of administrative regulations for examination.”177
3.1.2.2. Administrative and Judicial Review
In tandem with its economic reform, China began to curtail the
power of bureaucratic agencies in Administrative Litigation Law,
as effective in 1990. The fundamental tenet of the 1990 Administrative Litigation Law was the support of judicial oversight to curb
the abuse of administrative power and to promote accountability
of government officials.178 Despite such efforts, there were significant limits to the competence of the courts. Of greatest relevance
for the present purpose are the standard of review and the scope of
judicial oversight. First, arguably, the Administrative Litigation
Law can be narrowly read to limit judicial review to the legality,
and not the appropriateness, of administrative decisions.179 The
Law generally barred the courts from substituting their own judgments for those of administrative entities.180 Second, and more
tions, supra note 151, art. 7.
176 Id. art. 13.
177 Id.
178 See Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaption of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 119,
137 (2003) (examining mechanisms of judicial review of administrative decisions).
179
Id. However, there was a gray zone, as Article 54 of Administrative Litigation Law did empower the courts to revoke the administrative decisions involving “abuse of authority” and “excess of authority.” Administrative Litigation
Law, supra note 131, arts. 5, 54. Scholars were divided on the way to interpret
these vague terms. See Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in
the PRC, supra note 120, at 237–38 (arguing that “[t]he more robust the interpretation, the closer the court gets to substituting its own judgment and replacing a review of legality with a review of appropriateness . . . . PRC scholars are even more
divided about the meaning of abuse of authority.”).
180 Potter, supra note 178, at 138–39.
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crucially, judicial review was limited to concrete administrative
acts; the validity of administrative laws, regulations, and orders of
general application, as well as administrative decisions declared
final by applicable laws, were exempt from judicial oversight.181
Overall, the Administrative Litigation Law of 1990 was limited in
its effectiveness.
China’s weak judiciary in the administrative realm faced critical challenges as a result of its WTO membership. To ensure that
regulatory measures affecting trade are fairly administered, all
WTO Members are obliged, as a general rule, to offer the opportunity for an objective and impartial review of administrative decisions.182 China’s Accession Protocol took a similar but harsher approach by requiring China to “establish, or designate, and
maintain tribunals, contact points and procedures for the prompt
review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation
of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application,” as referenced in the relevant provisions
under the GATT, GATS, and TRIPs.183 Such a tribunal, as the Accession Protocol provided, shall be “impartial and independent” of
the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement.184 While
Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 131, art. 12.
See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153, art. X: 3 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994] (instating tribunals or procedures for review and correction of administrative actions);
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33
I.L.M. 1167, art. 6.2 (1994) [hereinafter GATS] (requiring administrative tribunals
or procedures to process prompt review of administrative decisions as called for);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, art. 41:4. (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (establishing the opportunity for a judicial authority to review administrative decisions).
183 Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (D).
184
Id. GATT 1994 Article X: 3(c) provides that the existing procedures in
force on the date of the GATT do not need to be substituted or eliminated even if
they are not “fully or formally independent of the agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement” so long as such procedures, as a matter of fact, offer “objective and impartial” review; see GATT, supra note 182, art. X: 3(c). For a detailed
comparison between judicial review requirement under the GATT, GATS, TRIPs,
and China’s Accession Protocol, see Chien-Huei Wu, Mission (Im)Possible? Could
the WTO Save Chinese Courts? 3 (2) NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 61 (2008) [hereinafter Wu, Mission (Im)Possible] (examining China’s WTO obligation in the context of
global standards of independence).
181
182
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judicial review obligations under WTO-covered agreements are
subject to compatibility requirements with the existing domestic
legal framework, China’s judicial review obligations are unconditional.185 Moreover, the Accession Protocol prescribed that “individuals and enterprises affected by any administrative action”
shall havve the opportunity to appeal in all cases to a judicial
body.186
These requirements implicated the manner in which China disciplined its regulatory agencies. In anticipation of its WTO accession, China, as noted above, revised and upgraded the Administrative Reconsideration Regulation to the Administrative
Reconsideration Law, offering a hierarchical intra-agency review of
administrative acts.187 Unlike the Administrative Litigation Law of
1990, the Administrative Reconsideration Law expanded the scope
of review by subjecting certain abstract administrative acts to administrative reconsideration.188 China’s WTO accession was shortly followed by legislative amendments and judicial interpretations
that granted rights to appeal for all WTO-related cases.189 These
review mechanisms were built upon, among others, the Adminis185 See Wu, Mission (Im)Possible, supra note 184, at 65 (discussing China’s “independent judicial review” obligation and what that obligation entails).
186
Accession Protocol, supra note 141, para. 2. (D); see also Julia Ya Qin,
“WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the WTO Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483, 496 (2003) [hereinafter Qin, An Appraisal of the China’s Accession Protocol] (arguing that such obligation
exceeded the WTO general requirements. For instance, there is no reference to
appeal of a tribunal decision in the GATS, while appeal to a court of the decision
by an independent tribunal under the GATT Article X is merely referred to as a
“possibility.”).
187
See Ohnesorge, supra note 122, at 141 (illustrating the steps taken by China to develop a uniform standard for administrative litigation).
188 Administrative Reconsideration Law, supra note 137, art. 7.
189
In 2002, China’s Supreme Court issued three judicial interpretations to
facilitate the judicial review of WTO-related administrative decisions: Regulations
on Several Problems in the Trial of Trade-Related Administrative Litigation Cases,
Regulations on the Application of Law in the Trial of Anti-Subsidy Administrative Litigation, and Regulations on the Application of Law in the Trial of AntiDumping. In China, these judicial interpretations and opinions are essentially
binding upon lower courts. See generally Nanping Liu, “Legal Precedents” with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, 5 J.
CHINESE L. 107 (1991) (examining the extent to which decisions by the Supreme
People’s Court are considered precedential in China’s legal system); Susan Finder, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 145
(1993) (discussing the role of the Supreme People’s Court in the context of China’s
legal tradition).
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trative Licensing Law and Legislation Law, which set boundaries
to control the conduct of public officials. Although there is much
room for improvement, on balance, as elaborated below, these and
many other efforts in connection with WTO membership illustrate
changes in Chinese review systems of administrative decisions
concerning trade.
3.2. Recent Developments in Core Elements of Regulatory Coherence
Recent years have witnessed China’s intensified efforts in the
pursuit of more efficient and effective administration. During the
Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,
held in October 2007, Chinese leaders reaffirmed their policy, stating: “We must keep to the path of political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, and integrate the leadership of
the Party, the position of the people as masters of the country, and
the rule of law.”190 Further, political reforms must be oriented toward “socialist democracy” by improving institutions for democracy and diversifying relevant channels to engage citizens in the
decision-making process.191 Governments should therefore “guarantee the people’s rights to be informed, to participate, to be heard,
and to oversee.”192
At about the same time, the State Council undertook a parallel
initiative by issuing the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government
Information, another milestone in China’s administrative law regime.193 Under this Regulation, governments at all levels are required to establish a process for disseminating “government information”—that is, “information made or obtained by
administrative organs in the course of exercising their responsibilities and recorded and stored in a given form.”194 Specifically, government agencies should disclose, on their own initiative, information that “involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or
190
Hu Jintao, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Oct. 15, 2007, part VI.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli [Regulation
on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by the State Council,
Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008).
194 Id. arts. 2, 4.
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other organizations,” “needs to be extensively known or participated in by the general public,” “shows the structure, function and
working procedures of and other matters relating to the administrative organ,” and “other information that should be disclosed on
the administrative organ’s own initiative according to laws, regulations, and relevant state provisions.”195 Disclosures should be
made “promptly and accurately” based on “the principles of justice, fairness, and convenience to the people.”196 Such voluntary
disclosure, as a general rule, must be done within twenty business
days from the date the information is introduced or changed.197
Government agencies should, moreover, respond to disclosure requests from the public within fifteen to thirty business days upon
receipt of such requests.198
Such disclosure obligations were implemented through detailed action plans. Launched in 2008 under the aegis of the State
Council, the Legislative Affairs Office was delegated the authority
to maintain the website of the China legislative information network system, to serve as a link to local government legislative affairs offices, and to publish laws, regulations, and departmental
rules, as well as drafts which were open for comment.199 Later, in
2010, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of
Administrative Cases of Government Information Disclosure,” offering administrative remedies in cases in which government
agencies failed to fulfill disclosure obligations.200 The State Council
in 2010 issued “Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the
Building of a Government Ruled by Law.”201 Based upon the 2004
Id. art. 9.
Id. arts. 5, 6.
art. 18.
198 Id. art. 24.
199 Guowuyuan guanyu jigou shezhi de tongzhi (国务院关于机构设置的通知)
[Notice of the State Council on the Establishment of Institutions] (compiled by
State Council Legislative Office, Jan. 17, 2007, effective Apr. 24, 2008),
CLI.2.312128(EN) (Lawinfochina).
200
Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli zhengfu xinxi gongkai xingzheng
anjian ruogan wenti de guiding (最高人民法院关于审理政府信息公开行政案件若
干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases about Open Government Information]
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, July 29, 2011; effective Aug. 13,
2011), CLI.3.156701(EN) (Lawinfochina).
201
Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu jianshe de yijian (国务院关于
加强法治政府建设的意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the
195
196
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Implementation Outline, the Opinions clarified the obligations of
regulatory agencies in the rulemaking process. In addition to
transparency, central and local administrative agencies were required to undertake “public solicitation of opinions, legality examination, and collective discussions” before issuing any “normative
documents”—documents with direct, binding effects on the rights
and obligations of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations.202
To improve the quality of legal institutions, governments were to
formulate and incorporate “cost-benefit analysis,” “social risk appraisal,” and “post-evaluation of government legislation” mechanisms in the decision-making process in general,203 while conducting “public hearings,” “expert consultations,” and “risk
assessments” for all major policy decisions relating to economic or
social development and the direct interests of the people.204 Moreover, the Opinions stressed that public participation must be
“broadly representative,” public opinions should be considered,205
and feedback on such opinions and the underlying reasons should
be published or addressed in a proper manner.206 All major policymaking processes were contingent upon risk assessments: “scientific surveys” and “comprehensive discussions of all sorts of
risks that may be triggered by the policy” would enable governments to “determine risk levels and formulate corresponding reconciliation and management plans.”207
The movement toward administration reforms was reaffirmed
by Chinese leaders through the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, issued on
March 14, 2011.208 All of the key elements of regulatory coherence—transparency, public participation, risk assessments, and review—were once again underscored. Since then, China has taken
two additional steps to perfect the administrative law regime.
Building of a Government Ruled by Law (promulgated by the State Council Legislative Office, Oct. 10, 2010), CLI.2.139971(EN) (Lawinfochina).
202 Id. at III. 9.
203 Id. at III. 7.
204 Id. at IV. 11–12.
205 Id. at IV. 11.
206 Id.
207 Id. at IV. 12.
208 Guomin Jingji he Shehui Fazhan Di Shier Ge Wunian Guihua Gangyao (
国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要) [The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 14, 2011, effective Mar. 14, 2011).
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With a view toward a “well-off society” and deepened rule-based
administration, the State Council in December 2015 repealed the
2010 Opinions by launching a multi-year program, namely, the
“Implementation Outline for Building a Government Ruled by
Law (2015-2020).”209 This 2015 Outline sought to enhance administrative efficiency by optimizing the structures and functions of
regulatory agencies, while solving the problems of inter-agency
conflicts and local protectionism. Through strict adherence to the
Legislation Law and the key elements mentioned above, the State
Council sought to promote a prompt, systemic, problem-solving,
and effective legislative regime.
In theory, much of these developments in the contemporary
Chinese administrative regime appear to indicate its compatibility
with the concept of regulatory coherence. As a matter of practice,
however, there are various obstacles due to China’s underlying political economy that may limit the role China can play in the emergence of global regulatory coherence.
4. CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD REGULATORY COHERENCE
While China’s administrative law system appears to—at least
nominally—embrace regulatory coherence, whether and how this
concept can be translated into practice depends upon the country’s
unique context. The political, social, and cultural context for the
design and evolution of China’s legal infrastructure is a critical
force in the development of regulatory coherence, both in discussion and in practice, in China and beyond. We leave for a later
study a critical additional concern—the extra financial and administrative burden on developing countries stemming from regulatory coherence, as well as the risk of regulatory capture by powerful
multinational enterprises on an international scale—which may
challenge the very emergence of this concept as the global default
rule.210
209
Fazhi zhengfu jianshe shishi gangyao (法治政府建设实施纲要 (2015–
2020)) [Implementation Outline for Building a Government Ruled by Law (2015–
2020)] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 23, 2015), CLI.5.261778(EN) (Lawinfochina).
210
The notion of regulatory coherence—or good regulatory practices—
mirrors in a way what has been criticized by Antony Anghie in discussing the use
of “good governance” as a means to imperial globalization and recolonization. As
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4.1. The Future of Regulatory Coherence: A Thorny Embrace for
China’s PTAs?
Although legal and political reforms over the past few decades
have largely transformed the Chinese administrative law regime,
the overall pattern of China’s PTAs demonstrates its reluctance to
fully embrace regulatory coherence. As of this writing, China has
concluded PTAs with fourteen trading partners, including Australia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chile,
Costa Rica, Georgia, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macau, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, and Peru, while
negotiating or updating another eleven PTAs, including the RCEP.
211

The overall structure of these PTAs reveals a rather complex
pattern in China’s approach to regulatory coherence. Unlike recent
practice in megaregional trade negotiations, none of the abovementioned Chinese PTAs contains a stand-alone chapter on regulatory coherence. These PTAs, instead, focus intently on regulatory
cooperation by establishing a detailed process of interaction between Chinese regulatory agencies and their foreign counterparts
through various schemes, such as mutual recognition agreements
or arrangements (MRAs), information sharing, and the establishment of oversight bodies. A closer examination of the provisions
under these PTAs, however, reveals some threads that link to regulatory coherence. First, some of China’s PTAs do refer to “good
regulatory practice.” The China–Switzerland FTA, for instance,
requires both Parties to incorporate good regulatory practice as
part of the cooperation mechanism. Article 6.5 reads in relevant
argued by Anghie, good governance may appear to be a neutral concept, but in
fact reflects and reproduces a set of principles related to free markets, democracy,
and the rule of law created and promoted by the West and further imposed on the
rest of the world. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 247–54 (2005). Jane Kelsey specifically argued that preparation of RIA documents and the notice and comment would impose significant
budgetary burdens on low-income developing countries, which, due to their limited resources, have other pressing issues to address. See Kelsey, supra note 118, at
3.
211
See
generally
CHINA
FTA
NETWORK,
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/KAC5-6LTU]
(last visited Sep. 23, 2017).
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part:
With a view to increasing their mutual understanding of
their respective systems, enhancing capacity building and
facilitating bilateral trade, the Parties shall strengthen their
technical cooperation in the following areas: . . .
(b) communication between each other’s competent authorities, exchange of information in respect of technical regulations, standards, conformity assessment procedures and
good regulatory practice.212
Similar provisions can be found in China’s PTAs vis-à-vis Australia,213 New Zealand,214 Iceland,215 and Costa Rica.216 Such provisions lead to two immediate observations. First, while these provisions appear to link good regulatory practice to the context of
technical barriers to trade, nowhere in these PTAs is the term
“good regulatory practice” defined. The only exception is Article
72.3 of the China–Costa Rica FTA, which provides that “the Parties
recognize the importance of applying good regulatory practice under the TBT Agreement, taking into consideration the decisions
and recommendations adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade . . . ”217 Through the incorporation of the
TBT Committee Decision, the notion of good regulatory practice
should be read, at least in the context of the China–Costa Rica FTA,
to include, among other items, transparency and public consultation schemes, regulatory impact assessment, approaches to minimize burdens on economic operators, review mechanisms for existing technical regulations and conformity assessment, and
consideration of special development, financial, and trade needs of
developing countries.218 Viewed in this light, good regulatory
212
Free Trade Agreement, China–Switz., July 6, 2013, art. 6.5 [hereinafter
China–Switzerland FTA].
213
Free Trade Agreement, China–Austl., June 17, 2015, art. 6.11 [hereinafter
China–Australia FTA].
214
Free Trade Agreement, China–N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, art. 96 [hereinafter China–New Zealand FTA].
215
Free Trade Agreement, China–Ice., Apr. 15, 2013, art. 20 [hereinafter China–Iceland FTA].
216 Free Trade Agreement, China–Costa Rica, Apr. 8, 2010, art. 72 [hereinafter
China–Costa Rica FTA].
217 Id. art. 72.3.
218 See WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade Since 1 Jan-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

182

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

practice reflects much of what is required by regulatory coherence.
Nevertheless, China’s obligation toward regulatory coherence is
softened by the proviso that the Parties recognize. Second, while
regulatory coherence by nature represents a set of overarching
principles guiding a domestic regulatory process, China limits the
scope of good regulatory practice exclusively to the TBT context.
This practice is contrary to the arrangements in TPP and the proposed negotiation text of TTIP.
Thus, it appears that China has been inclined to dilute the importance of regulatory coherence, either by keeping the language
vague or the scope of application narrow. In our opinion, such a
practice reflects the Chinese government’s view of its legal and political institutions—despite extensive reform—as below the desired
conditions to assume full commitments with respect to regulatory
coherence. This raises an immediate question: what hurdle, if any,
lies ahead of China’s march towards regulatory coherence? This
question may implicate not only the manner in which China addresses regulatory coherence in its current PTAs, but also the way
it negotiates relevant terms in the RCEP as well as OBOR settings
and beyond.
4.2. Panda in the Room: Coping with the Democratic Ramifications of
Regulatory Coherence
Regulatory coherence is, in essence, a multifaceted concept that
may go beyond regulatory modernization by touching upon politically sensitive issues like government accountability, democratic
control, and the rule of law. Whether and the extent to which China will implement all of these elements has direct bearing on the
future of global regulatory coherence and merits further exploration. We argue that China has embraced some sort of experimental
approach by implementing a “thin” regulatory coherence and remains ambivalent and cautious towards a “thicker” version of regulatory coherence.219 As analyzed below, we argue that the gap beuary 1995, WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.13 (adopted Mar. 8, 2017).
219 Here we build upon the “thin rule of law” and “thick rule of law” conceptual framework advanced by Randall Peerenboom in addressing China’s legal reform. According to Peerenboom’s theory, the thin version understands rule of
law in instrumental terms, addressing the formal aspects of a government system,
regardless of political underpinnings (e.g., democratic or non-democratic, capital-
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tween laws on the books and laws in action appears significant in
terms of the core elements of regulatory coherence.
First, numerous aspects of China’s policymaking remain complex and opaque, which leaves further room for administrative
discretion and corruption.220 Despite the progress in transparency,
government information disclosure is subject to certain qualifications. Administrative agencies, for instance, should disclose information that “involves the vital interests of citizens, legal persons
or other organizations,” “needs to be extensively known or participated in by the general public,” and “shows the structure, function
and working procedures of and other matters relating to the administrative organs.” 221 Further, this information “should [be]
disclose[d] on . . . [the administrative organ’s] own initiative” according to laws, regulations and relevant state provisions.222
Moreover, agencies are required to review whether such disclosure
is consistent with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Safeguarding State Secrets223 and take into account “state security,
public security, economic security, and social stability.”224 Thus,
these provisions create room for discretion, which in turn undermines the transparency requirement. As an illustration, China’s
environmental protection agencies at the central and local levels
have been repeatedly attacked for labeling environmental data as a
“national secrets” issue and refusing relevant disclosure.225
Similarly, while the public consultation function is designed as
a means of rationalizing the administrative rulemaking process, its
ism, or socialism). The thick version, by contrast, is concerned about legitimizing
regulatory acts by incorporating adequate substantive elements into a law. See
generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO RULE OF LAW 4–6 (2002).
220
See Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat—China Revision, at 11, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1 (July 20, 2012).
221
See Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information, supra note
193, at art. 9.
222 Id.
223 Id. at art. 14.
224 Id. at art. 8.
225
See Robert V. Percival & Zhao Huiyu, The Role of Civil Society in Environmental Governance in the United States and China, 24 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 141,
179–80 (2013) (comparing government information disclosure of China and the
U.S.); see also Xin huanbao fa xiaoguo pinggu: Xinxi gongkai reng bu lixiang (新环保法
效果评估：信息公开仍不理想) [An Evaluation of New Environmental Law: Information
Disclosure
is
Far
From
Ideal],
http://www.ogichina.org/article/125/28624.html
[https://perma.cc/8EW6CV3Q] (last visited: May 8, 2017).
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function could be undermined by the manner in which drafting
bodies interpret and carry out such a mandate in practice. In practice, public participation in the rulemaking processes in China remains relatively underdeveloped, with the primary objective being
to inform the public rather than to solicit opinions for improving
rulemaking.226 As a matter of interpretation, although the Legislation Law and its implementing regulations include the stage of notice and comment in the rulemaking process, these provisions can
arguably be interpreted as “voluntary,” leaving discretion to the
drafting agencies.227 Even when administrative bodies are willing
to include notice and comment as part of their rulemaking practice,
capacity building and financial burden appear to be critical challenges. According to Paler, “Hearing organizers have grappled
with how to balance between witnesses and audience members, to
ascertain when to hold a hearing and on what project, to reach results after official debate, and to generate interest in the face of
public apathy.”228 Thus, frustration over procedural irregularities
remains. Additionally, because hearing costs are greater than expert consultation, the source of funds and other compensation issues further complicate the matter.229 Another complication is the
participation in public hearings. To some extent, the effectiveness
of public consultation rests upon input from industry groups and
civil society. Regarding the former, while general observation reveals that industry associations as a whole have become more influential in shaping China’s public policies through various
routes,230 there are still constraints on the autonomy of these indus-

See Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 220, at 13.
Liu Xiao-mei (刘小妹), Gongzhong Canyu Xingzheng Lifa De Lilun Sikao
(公众参与行政立法的理论思考) [On Public Participation in Administrative Legislation], Xingzheng Faxue Yanjiu (行政法学研究2007年第2期第45页) [2 ADMIN. L.
REV. 40, 45 (2007)].
228 See Paler, supra note 165, at 317. An interesting development, as Horley
pointed out, is that both central and local governments have tapped into new
technologies by conducting notice and comment via the Internet. In a way, this
can reduce the administrative and financial burdens of holding public hearings.
See Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People’s Republic: Developing a More
Participatory Governance Model in China, in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 289, 299 (2010).
229 Id.
230 See Guosheng Deng & Scott Kennedy, Big Business and Industry Association
Lobbying in China: The Paradox of Contrasting Styles, 63 CHINA J. 101, 113 (2010) (illustrating the effects of industry associations on public policy in China).
226
227
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try groups.231 According to Stephanie Weil, even when industry
groups in certain areas, e.g., the software industry, enjoy greater
room to act on behalf of their members, their autonomy is nevertheless limited “as the government forbids absolute freedom in interest articulation.”232 These obstacles to independence can arguably undermine the role of industry stakeholders in the public
consultation process. Similarly, despite the growing number of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over the past few decades233 and their increasingly crucial role in certain areas such as
the environment, education, public health, and care of the disadvantaged,234 the development of NGOs in China is still in a nascent
stage in terms of scale and capacity when compared to its Western
counterparts.235 Given the political climate, generally NGOs operate in a repressed setting, with many of their activities falling under the oversight of the government.236 In 2016, China passed the
Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs, tightening its control
over the conduct of overseas NGOs237 and rendering it problematic
for international NGOs to gain a foothold in the nation. The overall atmosphere may generate these chilling effects, thereby inhibiting NGOs from actively participating in public consultation.238
231 See SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA (2005) (discussing
the influence of industry groups in the Chinese government’s decision-making
process).
232
STEFANIE WEIL, LOBBYING AND FOREIGN INTERESTS IN CHINESE POLITICS 77
(2017); see also id. at 45.
233
See generally, ANDREAS EDELE, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
CHINA (2005).
234
See Kerry Brown, China’s Challenges: Civil Society, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 14,
2001), http://thediplomat.com/2011/02/civil-society/ [https://perma.cc/DD2Y8QVA] (describing NGOs' roles in Chinese society).
235
See generally Shawn Shieh (谢世宏) & Amanda Brown-Inz (毕彦如),
Zhongguo Gongyi NGO Gailan (中国公益 NGO 概览) [China Public Welfare NGO
Overview], ZHONGGUO FAZHAN JIANBAO (中国发展简报 [CHINA DEV. BRIEF] (Jan. 14,
2013),
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/upload/userfiles/files/NGO%20Dir
ectory-3-26.pdf. [https://perma.cc/J2DR-853Q].
236
See Michael M. Gunter, Jr. & Ariane C. Rosen, Two-Level Games of International Environmental NGOs in China, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 270 (2012) (analyzing the role of international environmental NGOs within China).
237 Jingwai fei zhengfu zuzhi jingnei huodong guanli fa (境外非政府组织管理
办法) [Law on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental
Organizations within the Territory of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. National People’s Cong., Apr. 28, 2016, effective Jan. 1, 2017).
238
See, e.g., Minxin Pei, China’s Repression of Civil Society Will Haunt It,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug 5, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/46316820-6232-
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Second, while there have been endeavors to manage the myriad conflicts that may jeopardize China’s legal system by reducing
the number of ministries239 and strengthening the rulemaking
power of the National People’s Congress against the State Council
and local governments,240 interagency coordination remains a significant hurdle. In the area of energy policy, for instance, the decision-making paradigm is rather fragmented, with “over a dozen
powerful players at the national level.”241 One of the most notable
examples is the food safety governance system, where some fourteen agencies were involved in regulatory activities as of early
2013,242 a situation that was acknowledged as a crucial problem by
the State Council’s Food Safety Supervision System Plan for 2012–
2017.243 Such a fragmented regulatory environment poses great
challenges to interagency coordination, creates blind areas for
which agencies deny responsibility, and perpetuates loopholes in
routine control.244 Although the 2009 Food Safety Law and the
2015 Amendment attempted to address interagency coordination
deficits at various levels, the current state of affairs—multiple
agencies merely organized in a loosely coordinated system with
11dd-9ff9-000077b07658 [https://perma.cc/CBD6-QN6L] (arguing that despite
the explosion of the NGOs in China, “perhaps about 10 per cent of them can be
considered genuine NGOs in the western sense.”).
239 See Peerenboom, Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the PRC, supra note 120, at 207 (noting reduction of number of ministries as possible solution
to some conflicts in China's legal system).
240 See Paler, supra note 165, at 318 (describing attempts to solve challenges in
China's legal system through increasing the power of the National People's Congress).
241 CHEN GANG, CHINA’S CLIMATE POLICY 33 (1st ed. 2012).
242
Yongning Wu & Yan Chen, Food Safety in China, 67 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY &
COMMUNITY HEALTH 478, 478–79 (2013).
243
See M. Melinda Meador & Jie Ma, The Food Safety Management System in
FOREIGN
AGRICULTURAL
SERV.,
(2013)
China,
USDA
http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/The%20Food%20Saf
ety%20Management%20System%20in%20_Beijing_China%20%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_4-26-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EYV-5TR9]
(providing overview of China's food governance system).
244
See Ching-Fu Lin, Outsource Power, Import Safety? Challenges and Opportunities of the U.S.-China Food Safety Regulatory Cooperation, 72(1) FOOD & DRUG L. J.
32, 41–42 (2017) (illustrating challenges of China's food governance system); see
also NEIL COLLINS & JÖRN-CARSTEN GOTTWALD, THE CHINESE MODEL OF THE
REGULATORY STATE, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (David Levi-Faur
ed., 2011) (providing overview and challenges of China's food governance system); see generally FRANCIS SNYDER, FOOD SAFETY LAW IN CHINA: MAKING
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 108–79 (2015).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/4

2018]

The Emergence of Global Regulatory Coherence

187

overlapping competences, regulating different sections of the entire food supply chain—remains a challenge.245
Third, effective implementation of regulatory coherence is contingent upon a well-functioning and independent judiciary, which
serves to review administrative actions, enforce the law, and provide appropriate remedies. The problem of law enforcement is
very serious indeed, and the gap between written and enforced
rules remains significant.246 The court does not have formal authority to review, let alone revoke, legislation or regulations; rather, it can merely engage in a limited and indirect form of “judicial review” when the judge applies and interprets relevant
legislation and/or regulations in individual cases.247 Additionally,
neither the Administrative Litigation Law nor the Administrative
Reconsideration Law grants citizens the right to bring a case before
the court to challenge certain administrative actions.248 To our
knowledge, there has not been a case in which a court actually reviewed legislation or a regulation and revoked it based on the criteria of regulatory coherence, such as the lack of a duly performed
RIA, transparency, or public consultation. However, it should be
noted that at the administrative level, the State Council has in place
a “filing and review system” that establishes detailed procedures
for active monitoring and coordination of regulations and rules so
as to resolve conflicts between them.249 Given the vast amount of
See Lin, supra note 244.
See Xin Chunying, What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need? 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 58, 61 (2003) (discussing the failures of China’s judicial system); see also
MICHAEL A. SANTORO, CHINA 2020: HOW WESTERN BUSINESS CAN—AND SHOULD—
INFLUENCE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE COMING DECADE 54 (2009) (discussing western business' role in improving the efficacy of China's judicial system).
247 See generally Hand, supra note 173.
248
See generally ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW
170–73 (Mingan Jiang ed., 6th ed., 2015).
249
The State Council established a separate filing and review system. The
State Council mandated the reporting of rules in 1987, but it did not establish detailed procedures for review work until it issued the Provisions on Filing of Regulations and Rules in 1990 (“1990 Filing Provisions”). The 1990 Filing Provisions
set out the scope of local regulations and rules to be reported, established the State
Council Legislative Affairs Bureau as the principal office responsible for filing and
review work, and set out procedures and standards for reporting and review. See
Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Guiding (法规规章备案规定) [Provisions on the Filing of
Regulations and Rules] (promulgated by St. Council, Feb. 18, 1990, effective Feb.
18, 1990); see also Hand, supra note 173, at 162–63 (describing the 1990 Filing Provisions).
245
246
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local regulations, autonomous regulations, and rules filed, the State
Council—without rigorous external scrutiny and pressure—has
not delivered effective review and coordination, especially when it
has suffered from serious “capacity problems.”250 On the other
hand, the State Council may, upon request submitted by a provincial, autonomous region and municipal governments, approve the
request and consider major issues concerning the application and
interpretation of legislation as well as administrative regulations
and rules.251 In addition, governmental organizations, companies,
civil society groups, and individuals may submit a “proposal” (rather than a “challenge”) to the State Council or responsible authorities in provincial and autonomous regional governments in cases
in which the rules at issue may conflict with statutes or the Constitution.252 Nevertheless, the central review mechanism has only responded to these proposals in extremely rare instances.253 In any
event, such review work has not been conducted in a systematic
manner,254 and its effectiveness relies solely upon the discretion of
250 The NPCSC and State Council did not have the organizational capacity to
review the flood of legislation that lower-level organs filed annually, much less
discipline organs that failed to report legislation or resolve difficult conflicts under the existing framework. The State Council office responsible for filing and review had only twenty staff members and was forced to abandon active review of
all filed legislation. Instead, it decided to review legislation only when other state
organs or citizens complained about conflicts. See Hand, supra note 173, at 163;
see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 718
(1994) (discussing the NPCSC); Yahong Li, The Law-making Law: A Solution to the
Problems of the Chinese Legislative System? 30 H.K. L. J. 120, 124–25 (2000) (arguing
that the core issue of law-making in China is how to divide legislative power between the center and the states).
251
See Regulations on Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Regulations, supra note 151, art. 33.
252
See Legislation Law, supra note 144, art. 90; Regulations on Procedures
for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 152, art. 35.
253
Some scholars have highlighted the 2003 Zhigang Sun incident as a
landmark case where the State Council has responded to the proposal. See generally Zhang Qianfan & Huang Yue, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: the History, Status Quo, and Future of the Constitutional Review in Mainland China, in 2006
Liangan Si Di Falv Fazhan-Shangce (2006兩岸四地法律發展-上冊) [LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA, HONG KONG, MACAU, AND TAIWAN IN 2006, Techung Tang & Peng-Hsiang Wang eds., 2006], Vol. 1, at 45. But see Hand, supra
note 173, at 142. As Hand observed in 2013, the central review mechanism has
never responded to these proposals.
254
See Jue Huang, Explanations on the Proposed Legislation Law of the People’s
Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA 225–26 (Buyun Li et al, 2006)
(discussing sporadic review of conflict proposals by the State Council and provincial and regional authorities).
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the supervising authority and, ultimately, the will of the Party.
5. CONCLUSION
The last few decades have witnessed many initiatives across
various domestic and international institutions in response to
mushrooming regulatory-based trade barriers. Among the efforts
to balance regulatory autonomy and international cooperation,
regulatory coherence appears fairly promising according to a bottom-up rationalization of the domestic regulatory environment.
Led by the United States, recent megaregional agreements have incorporated some core elements of regulatory coherence, further
expanding its normative diffusion as a new global norm. Yet the
global entrenchment of regulatory coherence is, in our view, contingent upon the capacity and the inclination of emerging economies, most notably, China. While China’s decades-long institutional reforms have reshaped its legal infrastructure in a manner
that is formalistically aligned with good regulatory practices, its
PTAs highlight a lack of political will to assume a full commitment
beyond its domestic reign. Because this experimental approach reflects China’s dependence on trial-and-error in other areas, the
fundamental challenge rests upon the rule of law, democratic accountability, and political reforms, which may perpetuate rather
than alleviate obstacles to China’s future advancement toward
global regulatory coherence.
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